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THE DYNAMISM OF TREATIES 
YANBAI ANDREA WANG∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 How do treaties change over time?  This Article joins a growing 
body of scholarship focusing not on formal change mechanisms but 
instead on informal change arising from a treaty’s implementation 
in practice.  Informal implementation is often murky, poorly docu-
mented, and may be indistinguishable from noncompliance.  Yet it 
is significant both doctrinally under the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties—a set of rules for the formation and operation of 
treaties—and in its own right, when it does not meet the require-
ments to be doctrinally relevant.  Based on a deep dive into the 
history of one of the oldest areas of continuous international reg-
ulation, infectious disease control, and drawing on insights from 
scholarship on how domestic contracts, statutes, and institutions 
change informally over time, I argue that (1) change in informal 
implementation is often an alternative to formal change pursued 
by those unable to achieve the latter; (2) the process of informal 
implementation is akin to a strategic game in which a host of actors 
struggle to move the practice of a treaty toward their own prefer-
ences; and (3) informal implementation-level change has the po-
tential to be vast in scope and can precipitate legislative updates 
later on. 
 Understanding that transformative change can originate from 
the complex, decentralized, and oftentimes opaque world of infor-
mal treaty implementation raises new inquiries and impacts long-
standing issues in international law.  It asks, at the most fundamen-
tal level, what exactly written international law is—a blueprint 
awaiting faithful execution or a departure point for further bar-
gaining?  It calls for a more nuanced understanding of compli-
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ance—currently, a central preoccupation in the field—since non-
compliance can in fact be implementation leaping ahead of the 
treaty as written.  And it invites a normative exploration of whether 
informal implementation is a cause for concern because it moves 
treatymaking away from highly visible formal processes, or a 
mechanism to be channeled because it could expand the voices and 
influence of the disempowered. 
INTRODUCTION 
Treaties1 have been in the limelight in recent years, from U.S. with-
drawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership2 and the Paris Climate Agree-
ment,3 to the leaked Executive Order calling for a moratorium on new multi-
lateral agreements.4  These explicit changes have occupied center stage.  Yet, 
subtler implementation-level shifts are occurring too: slashes to the budgets 
of agencies overseeing treaties,5 reduction and replacement of personnel 
within those agencies,6 and the rise of an “America first” perspective.7  Such 
                                                          
 1.  I use the terms treaties, international agreements, conventions, and regulations interchange-
ably to mean those international compacts that are formally negotiated and memorialized in writing.  
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties similarly defines “treaty” to mean “an international 
agreement concluded between [s]tates in written form and governed by international law . . . what-
ever its particular designation.”  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(a), May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].  I recognize that these terms have different 
meanings in other settings. 
 2.  Aaron Blake, Why Donald Trump’s Move to End the Trans-Pacific Partnership Is So 
Hugely Symbolic, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2017/01/23/why-donald-trumps-move-to-end-the-trans-pacific-partnership-is-so-hugely-
symbolic/?utm_term=.4b58d81670b8.  After U.S. withdrawal, the remaining countries negotiated a 
new trade agreement—the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship—which incorporates much of the original pact entered into force in December 2018.  James 
McBride & Andrew Chatzy, What is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
REL. (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-trans-pacific-partnership-tpp.  
 3.  Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. from Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.html.  
 4.  Courtenay R. Conrad & Emily Ritter, A Trump Moratorium on International Treaties 
Could Roll Back Human Rights—Here at Home, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/01/a-trump-moratorium-on-international-treaties-
could-roll-back-human-rights-here-at-home/?utm_term=.cf8681ada24a.  
 5.  President Trump’s proposed budget for 2018 cut nearly thirty percent from the Department 
of State and the United States Agency for International Development.  Gregory Krieg & Will Mul-
lery, Trump’s Budget by the Numbers: What Gets Cut and Why, CNN (May 23, 2017), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/23/politics/trump-budget-cuts-programs/index.html.  
 6.  Jessica Schulberg & Alissa Scheller, Trump Gutted the State Department and Half of Top 
Jobs Are Still Unfilled, HUFF POST (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/donald-
trump-state-department-positions_us_58e3e8bee4b0f4a923b2ba5e.   
 7.  Griff Witte & Michael Birnbaum, A Year of Trump’s ‘America First’ Agenda Has Radi-
cally Changed the U.S. Role in the World, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2018), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/world/a-year-of-trumps-america-first-agenda-has-radically-changed-the-us-role-in-
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informal adjustments to how treaties are put into practice on the ground occur 
perennially, often below the radar of public attention and in the absence of 
any apparent changes to the agreement itself.  They can fundamentally alter 
how treaties play out in the world.  But their mechanism, scope, and signifi-
cance are poorly understood. 
This Article interrogates the simple question of how written interna-
tional law changes over time.8  It shines a spotlight on below-the-surface 
changes that emanate from the way a treaty is informally implemented in 
practice—what I refer to as “informal implementation dynamism.”  As key 
treaties age, there is growing concern about whether they are able to evolve 
with the regulatory needs of the international community.9  The past few 
years have seen a flowering of literature on this question,10 but existing schol-
arship focuses primarily on doctrinal rules in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention” or “Convention”),11 formal flexibility 
mechanisms built into a treaty at the outset,12 and the formal ways in which 
a treaty is implemented by contracting states, such as by adopting domestic 
legislation.13  The Vienna Convention itself contains a controversial doctrinal 
rule for folding certain types of practice back into treaty interpretation.  That 
                                                          
the-world/2018/01/20/c1258aa6-f7cf-11e7-9af7-
a50bc3300042_story.html?utm_term=.2f7f1fd6ad64. 
 8.  Excluded from my inquiry is customary international law, which arises from the “general 
and consistent practice of states followed . . . from a sense of legal obligation.”  RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 
1987).  Since customary international law is derived in part from practice, mechanisms of imple-
mentation change are built into its very definition. 
 9.  See infra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 10.  See, e.g., EIRIK BJORGE, THE EVOLUTIONARY INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES (2014); 
CHRISTIAN DJEFFAL, STATIC AND EVOLUTIVE TREATY INTERPRETATION: A FUNCTIONAL RECON-
STRUCTION (2016); Mónika Ambrus & Ramses A. Wessel, Between Pragmatism and Predictability: 
Temporariness in International Law, in NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2014 
(Mónika Ambrus & Ramses A. Wessel eds., 2015); TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE (Georg 
Nolte ed., 2013); UNIVERSALITY AND CONTINUITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Thilo Marauhn & 
Heinhard Steiger eds., 2011); Rebecca Crootof, Change Without Consent: How Customary Inter-
national Law Modifies Treaties, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. 237 (2016). 
 11.  The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties sets the rules for the adoption and operation 
of treaties.  See generally Vienna Convention, supra note 1. 
 12.  These built-in formal flexibility mechanisms can include reservations, escape clauses, al-
ternative rules for amendment that are easier than those in the Vienna Convention, and limited du-
ration of the treaty. See B. Boockmann & Paul W. Thurner, Flexibility Provisions in Multilateral 
Environmental Treaties, 6 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL., L., & ECON. 113 (2006) (surveying 
the range of amendment rules in multilateral environmental treaties); Laurence R. Helfer, Flexibility 
in International Agreements, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 175, (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack 
eds., 2013) (distinguishing between and providing examples of formal and informal flexibility 
mechanisms). 
 13.  See, e.g., Jean Galbraith, Making Treaty Implementation More Like Statutory Implementa-
tion, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1309 (2017). 
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rule states that treaties must be interpreted in the context of “subsequent prac-
tice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the 
parties regarding its interpretation.”14  Much attention has been devoted to 
asking what type and level of practice ought to have influence on interpreta-
tion, whose practice matters, and what degree of change this interpretive rule 
should accommodate.15  Yet, informal changes to implementation—for in-
stance, through altering conduct, withholding funds, reorganizing offices and 
personnel, or even noncompliance—have not received sustained attention in 
their own right, despite their feasibility and pervasiveness.16 
Focus on what counts as change under doctrinal rules and formal change 
mechanisms misses too much of the broader story concerning where change 
comes from and how it is achieved.  Take the regulation of infectious dis-
ease—one of the oldest areas of continuous international cooperation, dating 
back to the mid-nineteenth century.17  The most recent formal change oc-
curred when the 2005 International Health Regulations (“2005 IHR”)18 re-
placed the 1969 International Health Regulations (“1969 IHR”).19  This revi-
sion was considered “[a] revolution in the governance of global infectious 
disease.”20  The scope of coverage expanded from three specific contagions 
                                                          
 14.  Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 31(3)(b). 
 15.  See, e.g., IRINA BUGA, MODIFICATION OF TREATIES BY SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE (2018);  
TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE, supra note 10; Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its 
Seventieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at 11–116 (2018) [hereinafter U.N. A/73/10]; Int’l Law 
Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixtieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/63/10, at 365–89 (2008) [herein-
after U.N. A/63/10]. 
 16.  See, e.g., Helfer, supra note 12, at 178 (noting that scholars “have made considerable pro-
gress” in examining formal flexibility tools but have “given shorter shift” to informal flexibility 
tools); Georg Nolte, Introduction, in TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 1, 3 
(noting that “formal procedures by which parties to a treaty can accommodate change” are “either 
only rarely used or do not pose difficult legal problems,” whereas “[i]n most cases, the evolution of 
the context of a treaty must be accommodated by more informal means”); Gérardine Meishan Goh, 
Softly, Softly Catchee Monkey: Informalism and the Quiet Development of International Space Law, 
87 NEB. L. REV. 725, 726 (2009) (“Where the traditional methods of international treaty-making 
have proven insufficiently efficient or up-to-date, recourse to informalism and soft law methods has 
provided the panacea.”). 
 17.  For accounts of the early history of international infectious disease cooperation, see NE-
VILLE M. GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR WORK (1971); NOR-
MAN HOWARD-JONES, THE SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND OF THE INTERNATIONAL SANITARY CON-
FERENCES 1851–1938 (1975); Richard N. Cooper, International Cooperation in Public Health as a 
Prologue to Macroeconomic Cooperation, in CAN NATIONS AGREE? ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC COOPERATION (Richard N. Cooper et al. eds., 1989). 
 18.  World Health Organization [WHO], International Health Regulations (2005), May 23, 
2005, 2509 U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter 2005 IHR]. 
 19.  WHO, International Health Regulations, July 25, 1969, 764 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 1969 
IHR]. 
 20.  David P. Fidler, Germs, Governance, and Global Public Health in the Wake of SARS, 113 
J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 799, 799 (2004). 
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to “all events which may constitute a public health emergency of interna-
tional concern.”21  Self-reporting by state parties was supplanted by a broader 
and more active surveillance system managed by the World Health Organi-
zation (“WHO”)22 and relied heavily on internet detection tools.23  And, the 
overall objective of the law shifted from preventing the spread of disease 
across national borders to swiftly controlling outbreaks at their source with 
unprecedented requirements for state parties to develop domestic public 
health capacities.24  On the surface, viewed through the lens of the Vienna 
Convention and formal change mechanisms, this transformation seems to 
have begun with a 1995 WHO resolution delegating the organization’s staff 
to prepare an update for the then-in-force 1969 IHR.25  It appears to have 
ended with three weeks of intergovernmental negotiations in 2004 and 
2005.26 
Digging below the surface, a different picture emerges.  One WHO of-
ficial retrospectively described the 2005 IHR as the “institutionaliz[ation]” 
of policy decisions that had already been made.27  The 2003 epidemic of Se-
vere Acute Respiratory Syndrome—a disease not covered under the 1969 
IHR—was handled in much the same way as the 2005 IHR would dictate two 
years later.28  The internet surveillance tools that would become critical under 
the 2005 IHR were developed during the early to mid-1990s, predating the 
1995 WHO resolution.29  Reaching even further back, a 1976 outbreak of 
Ebola—again, not covered under the 1969 IHR—elicited a swift effort to 
                                                          
 21.  2005 IHR, supra note 18, art. 6(1). 
 22.  See infra Section III.C. 
 23.  See infra notes 274–281 and accompanying text. 
 24.  See 2005 IHR, supra note 18, annex 1.A. 
 25.  World Health Assembly Res. 48.7, Revision and Updating of the International Health Reg-
ulations, at 2, WHO Doc. A48/VR/12 (May 12, 1995). 
 26.  The negotiations were called “Intergovernmental Working Groups” and held in November 
2004 and February 2005, the latter of which was suspended and reconvened for a final session in 
May 2005.  See Revision of the International Health Regulations: IGWG-1-12 November 2004, 
WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://apps.who.int/gb/ghs/e/e-igwg.html (last visited May 10, 2019) (con-
taining documentation on the first Intergovernmental Working Group held in November 2004); Re-
vision of the International Health Regulations: IGWG/2 - 21-26 February 2005, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG., http://apps.who.int/gb/ghs/e/e-igwg2.html (last visited May 10, 2019) (containing documen-
tation on the second Intergovernmental Working Group held in February 2005). 
 27.  ALISON MACK ET AL., NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., GLOBAL HEALTH RISK 
FRAMEWORK: GOVERNANCE FOR GLOBAL HEALTH: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 22 (2016) (citing Da-
vid Heymann, former Assistant Director-General for Communicable Diseases at the WHO). 
 28.  See Yanbai Andrea Wang, Who Makes International Law? How the World Health Organ-
ization Changed the Regulation of Infectious Disease 192–222 (May 18, 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Oxford) (on file with author). 
 29.  See infra notes 274–281 and accompanying text. 
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control the disease at its source, similar to the epidemic responses now un-
dertaken under the 2005 IHR.30  In fact, as early as the 1960s and 1970s, 
many involved in the implementation of the 1969 IHR pointed out its short-
comings and discussed the need for a novel approach resembling the 2005 
IHR.31 
The 1969 IHR thus changed through informal implementation dyna-
mism.  These implementation-level changes did not constitute “subsequent 
practice” for purposes of interpretation under the Vienna Convention, yet 
their scope was vast, and they precipitated more formal, legislative updates 
later on.  While these developments are not accounted for by existing inter-
national law scholarship, a number of international relations scholars have 
highlighted the politics surrounding the implementation of international 
agreements and the internal workings of international organizations as key to 
understanding how treaties are actualized in the world.32  Scholars of domes-
tic law and institutions have also investigated how the dynamics of informal 
implementation generate change.33 
This Article ties together and adds to these disparate strands of scholar-
ship by telling an overlooked narrative about informal implementation dyna-
mism in the infectious disease context.  Understanding treaty dynamism is a 
“singularly important task,” with numerous scholars and practitioners calling 
for investigations into “the dynamic process through which [international] 
law changes and develops.”34  Drawing from diverse literatures on how do-
                                                          
 30.  See Wang, supra note 28, at 147–50. 
 31.  See infra notes 188–199, 239–241 and accompanying text. 
 32.  See, e.g., Karen Alter & Kal Raustiala, The Rise of International Regime Complexity, 14 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 329 (2018); Karen J. Alter & Sophie Meunier, The Politics of Interna-
tional Regime Complexity, 7 PERSP. ON POL. 13, 13 (2009) [hereinafter Alter & Meunier, The Pol-
itics of International Regime Complexity]; Karen J. Alter & Sophie Meunier, Nested and Overlap-
ping Regimes in the Transatlantic Banana Trade Dispute, 13 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 362, 362–63 
(2006) [hereinafter Alter & Meunier, Nested and Overlapping Regimes]; Harold Hongju Koh, Ad-
dress: Twenty-First-Century International Lawmaking, 101 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 14, 18 (2012); Ja-
net Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade 
Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125, 126 (2005); CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTA-
TION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 3 (2009); Laurence Helfer, Understanding Change in Inter-
national Organizations: Globalization and Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649 (2006). 
 33.  See infra Part II. 
 34.  Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Law, Legalization, and Politics: An Agenda for the 
Next Generation of IL/IR Scholars, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART, supra note 12, at 34, 40; see also 
GREGORY MESSENGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION LAW: EXAMINING 
CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (2016) (arguing that “accounts of . . . international law . . . 
based on law as expressed through [judicial or quasi-legislative] decisions . . . at specific points in 
time” are “distract[ing] us from appreciating that law develops continually and that snapshots . . . 
are not adequate to explain how law develops”); Rene Uruena, Temporariness and Change in 
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mestic statutes, contracts, and institutions change over time, as well as ar-
chival research at the WHO, I offer three sets of insights that provide a frame-
work for thinking about change achieved through informal implementation, 
why it matters even when it is not doctrinally significant, and how it is related 
to formal change. 
First, informal implementation-level change can be an alternative to for-
mal change mechanisms.35  Informal implementation-level change is often 
pursued precisely because formal change is not achievable.  Those displeased 
with a treaty as written can try to bring about formal change such as its 
amendment, judicial reinterpretation, or wholesale termination, but such ex-
plicit changes may require an unattainable level of consensus or impose un-
affordable costs in time and resources even when flexibility mechanisms are 
built into the treaty.36  The proponents of change must then operate with more 
stealth and less fanfare by implementing the agreement in novel ways.  Im-
plementation presents new questions or new permutations of old questions, 
which, in turn, open up space to redefine the boundary between what the law 
condones or authorizes and what it does not.  Informal implementation offers 
unique opportunities for change because the stakes are lower, the process is 
less publicly visible, the circumstances are more concrete, and the actors in-
volved are typically fewer in number and lower in the chain of command. 
Second, the process of implementation is a strategic game that unfolds 
over time, as a host of actors—often a different and sometimes a broader set 
of actors than those empowered to enact formal change—struggle to move 
the agreement toward their own preferences.37  Change is achieved through 
three key mechanisms that are currently under-explored: (1) a treaty’s imple-
menters may convert or redirect the agreement toward new ends through al-
tered practice; (2) implementers may erode a treaty through neglect or active 
resistance to adaptation in the face of drifting background circumstances; 
                                                          
Global Governance, in NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2014, supra note 10, 
at 19, 25 (observing “international law’s theory of change is one of a constant present,” with the 
new completely replacing the old “as if nothing had ever changed”); Jana von Stein, The Engines 
of Compliance, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART, supra note 12, at 477, 496 (noting that “it is worth-
while to start looking at the causal impact of international law through a different lens, which could, 
for instance, involve studying changes in practice or implementation”); Robert Howse & Ruti Teitel, 
Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why International Law Really Matters, 1 GLOBAL POL’Y 127, 135 
(2010) (calling for greater attention to the downstream processes by which treaties are translated 
into action). 
 35.  See infra Section III.A. 
 36.  See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 
54 INT’L ORG. 421, 422–23 (2000) (noting that hard law “entails significant costs,” including trans-
action costs, uncertainty, and implications for national sovereignty). 
 37.  See infra Section III.C.  I use the analogy of a game metaphorically, not in the game theory 
sense. 
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(3) implementers may shift management of the underlying problem to an-
other institutional arrangement—be it another law or an unofficial policy, in-
ternational or domestic, an alternative that is already in existence, or one cre-
ated specifically for the purpose of moving away from the disfavored treaty.  
This latter mechanism is particularly salient in the international context given 
the fragmented and non-hierarchical nature of the international sphere.38 
Third, informal implementation dynamism is real change and not 
simply gap-filling adaptations in the service of maintaining overarching sta-
bility.39  This is so even when it does not rise to the level of being doctrinally 
recognized as subsequent practice.  These three mechanisms may look like 
stability or noncompliance in the short-term, but their overall effect can add 
up and become transformative across long spans of time.  In many instances 
in the history of the 1969 and 2005 IHRs, the scope of change possible via 
implementation dynamism was far broader than what could be achieved 
through textual amendment.  Consequently, the laws looked superficially sta-
ble or were amended in trivial ways while sweeping changes occurred incre-
mentally on the ground.40  Over time, the strategic struggle of informal im-
plementation can lead a treaty to stray unpredictably until what is happening 
in practice bears little relation to the original intention of the treaty makers or 
the words of the treaty. 
Implementation dynamism is also real in that it can inform and facilitate 
subsequent formal negotiations.  In the case of the 1969 IHR, implementers 
chose to avoid textual revision, opting instead for shifts in implementation 
that might “prepare the ground” for a more formal change to the treaty at a 
later time.41  Those areas where implementers had developed new proce-
dures, policies, or technical tools, and where they could point to an existing 
record of successful operation, were subsequently the least controversial dur-
ing the 2005 IHR’s negotiation.  Implementing a change on the ground can 
lower the barrier for an ensuing textual amendment by reducing the uncer-
tainty surrounding a novel approach and altering perceptions or preferences 
about possible future options. 
These insights exposing the dynamics behind the ordinary, everyday in-
formal implementation of treaties are long overdue.  They were repeatedly 
borne out in the history of international infectious disease regulation as im-
plementers time and again pursued informal adjustments to implementation 
when the same formal changes were considered politically infeasible or after 
                                                          
 38.  See Alter & Raustiala, supra note 32, at 329 (discussing the density of overlapping and 
nonhierarchical rules and institutions that now exist at the global level). 
 39.  See infra Section III.C. 
 40.  See infra Section III.C (discussing significant informal changes made on the ground). 
 41.  Memorandum from Boris Velimirovic, Reg’l Officer for Communicable Diseases for the 
Reg’l Office of Eur., World Health Org., to Ian D. Carter, Chief of Epidemiological Surveillance of 
Communicable Diseases, World Health Org. (Feb. 7, 1980) (on file with author). 
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similar formal proposals were rejected during negotiations.42  Implementers 
achieved far-reaching change in practice and, decades later, pushed for tex-
tual amendments when windows of opportunity opened.  These observations 
have parallels in the work of scholars investigating how contracts,43 stat-
utes,44 and institutions45 change over time. 
This Article uses case studies to demonstrate the mechanisms and im-
portance of implementation dynamism.46  While the international regulation 
of infectious disease has some exceptional qualities,47 it provides particularly 
clear illustrations of mechanisms that have been observed in other issue areas 
as well.48  Through an examination of international infectious disease law 
over time, I show that the interplay between informal implementation dyna-
mism and explicit treaty dynamism is complex.  What looks like textual sta-
bility on the surface may mask underlying dynamism in practice.  What ap-
pears to be a stark break from the previous treaty can obscure lurking conti-
nuities.  Sometimes, shifts in practice followed from textual changes.  Other 
times, informal implementation changes leaped ahead and facilitated subse-
quent textual revision. 
Understanding that treaty dynamism is varied and complex provides a 
new lens for viewing foundational issues in international law and calls for 
further study.  First, more in-depth case studies are needed to ascertain the 
extent to which the findings of this Article are generalizable across other ar-
eas of international law.  Since informal implementation-level changes are 
hard to detect over short spans of time and from readily available written 
public sources, these studies must be longitudinal and examine the internal 
workings of a myriad of implementers.  Second, informal implementation 
dynamism complicates our very idea of what a treaty is.  The current down-
playing of informal implementation in the literature suggests that written 
                                                          
 42.  See generally infra Part III. 
 43.  See infra Section II.A. 
 44.  See infra Section II.B. 
 45.  See infra Section II.C. 
 46.  This project is descriptive.  Its methodology is historical process tracing of a longitudinal 
case study.  I do not assert that the insights illuminated by international infectious disease regulation 
are equally applicable across all treaty areas.  My goal is to uncover and generate hypotheses re-
garding a range of under-examined mechanisms of treaty change, so that more precise questions 
can be formulated for systematic study.  See HARRY ECKSTEIN, REGARDING POLITICS: ESSAYS ON 
POLITICAL THEORY, STABILITY, AND CHANGE 143 (1992) (arguing that case studies can “stimulate 
the imagination toward discerning important general problems and possible theoretical solutions”); 
ALEXANDER L. GEORGE & ANDREW BENNETT, CASE STUDIES AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT IN 
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 20 (2005) (noting that detailed analyses of historical episodes are advanta-
geous for “identif[ying] . . . new variables and hypotheses”). 
 47.  See infra Part IV. 
 48.  See, e.g., Levit, supra note 32 (describing similar informal change processes in interna-
tional trade and finance); DEERE, supra note 32 (describing same in international intellectual prop-
erty rights). 
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treaties are blueprints awaiting faithful actualization.  In fact, treaties may 
more accurately be described as departure points for further bargaining 
among implementers as constraints and opportunities reveal themselves over 
time.  Cast in this light, informal change may be mistaken for noncompliance 
in the short-term, and the concept of compliance—currently a “central pre-
occupation”49 among international law scholars—may need refinement to ac-
count for the complex and bidirectional relationship between a treaty on the 
books and its implementation out in the world.  Third, informal implementa-
tion raises questions concerning its positive and negative implications as well 
as who it empowers.  Consent is currently at the core of treaty making and 
has long been the touchstone of legitimacy.  Yet, the findings of this Article 
suggest that treaties can informally evolve beyond or against their text, po-
tentially undermining the initial consent of state parties—particularly those 
states with the most power in the formal negotiation process—and perhaps 
lending a greater voice to disempowered actors.  Further normative inquiry 
is needed to test this hypothesis and to provide a theoretical account of these 
power dynamics.   
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I examines the formal mecha-
nisms of change within the Vienna Convention, including a set of rules for 
formation, amendment, and abrogation, as well as a set of rules for interpre-
tation that have been the subject of much debate.  Recognizing that the Vi-
enna Convention does not adequately account for informal implementation-
level change, Part II gleans insights from scholarship on how contracts, stat-
utes, and domestic institutions change over time.  In each area of study, schol-
ars contend that attention to everyday implementation reveals change not ap-
parent or foreseeable from the written covenant itself.  Part III presents the 
central insights of this Article based on vignettes from the history of interna-
tional infectious disease regulation.  I argue that implementation is a strategic 
game that takes place over time, that it empowers a set of actors who may not 
be able to effect explicit change to the treaty, and that it transpires via three 
key mechanisms that I describe and illustrate.  Part IV takes a broader look 
at informal implementation dynamism as a research agenda.  I identify for 
future exploration empirical, conceptual, and normative questions that arise 
when written international law is placed in temporal context. 
                                                          
 49.  Howse & Teitel, supra note 34, at 128. 
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I.  AN IMPOVERISHED UNDERSTANDING OF CHANGE 
Treaties, particularly multilateral ones, grew rapidly in number, scale, 
and significance over the course of the twentieth century.50  As these agree-
ments age and the circumstances of their adoption become more remote, 
many have asked whether they are able to evolve with the regulatory needs 
of the international community.51  This inquiry, however, has been largely 
limited to the formal mechanisms of change found within the Vienna Con-
vention, which sets the rules for the adoption and operation of treaties. 
Focusing on the Vienna Convention and its formal rules for change has 
superficial appeal.  The Convention was intended to provide “orderly proce-
dures . . . for dealing with needed adjustments and changes in treaties.”52  
Parts of the Convention have been recognized as customary international law 
applicable to all countries53 and even to treaties concluded before its entry 
into force in 1980.54  Most of the Vienna Convention’s change mechanisms 
are public and explicit, and, therefore, easy to detect and examine.55  But an 
exclusive focus on the Vienna Convention assumes that change only occurs 
according to its rules—an assumption that does not bear out in reality. 
                                                          
 50.  Campbell McLachlan, The Evolution of Treaty Obligations in International Law, in TREA-
TIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 69, 71 (“It has been estimated that the number 
of treaties more than tripled from 1970 to 1997.”); Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing 
from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202, 208 (2010) (“There has . . . been a proliferation of 
treaties, both in quantity and range of subject matter, especially after the establishment of the United 
Nations system at the end of World War II.”); Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 
VA. L. REV. 1573, 1625 (2011) (“Treaties have proliferated . . . .”). 
 51.  U.N. A/63/10, supra note 15, at 366 (arguing that the International Law Commission 
should revisit the subject of treaty evolution over time because “[p]roblems arise frequently in this 
context”); Gabriella Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of International Law, 
49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 323, 353 (2008) (arguing that the stability of multilateral treaties “is at once a 
curse and a blessing” because “adaptation to reflect changing circumstances, new scientific data, or 
technological advances” is “exceptionally difficult”); Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding International 
Law: Rethinking the Doctrine of Sources, 93 IOWA L. REV. 65, 76, 89 (2007) (lamenting that 
“[t]reaties can often seem anachronistic as the world changes around them” because “once ratified, 
it becomes very difficult to change the rules”). 
 52.  Message to the Senate Transmitting the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, PUB. 
PAPERS 1131 (Nov. 22, 1971). 
 53.  The Convention was drafted over the course of two decades to codify already existing 
customary international law.  Aspects of the Convention have been recognized as customary inter-
national law by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) as well as countries that are not state 
parties, such as the United States.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2018) (noting that the United 
States is not a party to the Vienna Convention but considers “many of the provisions of the Vienna 
Convention . . . to constitute customary international law on the law of treaties”). 
 54.  RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 5–6 (2d ed. 2015). 
 55.  The Vienna Convention’s change mechanisms involving treaty interpretation can be more 
difficult to detect.  Research on treaty interpretation relies heavily on the written opinions of inter-
national adjudicatory bodies, which are—again—readily accessible, yet only capable of providing 
a partial picture of the interpretation that is occurring. 
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This Part examines the change mechanisms within the Vienna Conven-
tion.  I look first at a set of rules for formation, amendment, and abrogation.  
I then turn to a set of rules for interpretation that have been the subject of 
scholarly and doctrinal debate.  Finally, I discuss why the Convention’s doc-
trinal rules are insufficient for developing an overarching understanding of 
how treaties change and suggest a broader set of questions as a starting point 
for that task. 
A.   Treaty Formation, Amendment, and Abrogation 
The bulk of the provisions contained in the Vienna Convention specify 
rules for change at three critical junctures in the lifecycle of a treaty: for-
mation,56 amendment,57 and abrogation.58  For a change to occur under these 
rules, certain procedures must be followed and formalities must be met. 
With respect to formation, the Convention dictates that every state pos-
sesses the “capacity to conclude treaties.”59  A treaty is typically adopted by 
the consent of all negotiating states60 and enters into force according to pro-
visions within the agreement.61  Consent to be bound can be expressed in a 
number of ways62 by a range of state representatives,63 and states may uni-
laterally exclude or modify certain provisions through reservations.64 
Once adopted and entered into force, a treaty can be amended by agree-
ment between the parties according to the same rules that applied to the 
treaty’s initial formation or by different rules set out within the treaty.65  Un-
der the Convention’s default rules, to amend a multilateral treaty as between 
all the parties, every contracting party must be notified of the proposal for 
                                                          
 56.  Part II of the Vienna Convention governs the conclusion and entry into force of treaties.  
See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, arts. 6–25. 
 57.  Part IV of the Vienna Convention governs the amendment and modification of treaties.  
See id. arts. 39–41. 
 58.  Part V of the Vienna Convention governs the invalidity, termination, and suspension of the 
operation of treaties.  See id. arts. 42–72. 
 59.  Id. art. 6. 
 60.  Id. art. 9.  If adopted at an international conference, a vote of two-thirds of the states present 
and voting is needed unless the same majority opts for a different rule.  Id. 
 61.  Id. art. 24.  If there is no relevant provision or agreement, then a treaty enters into force as 
soon as consent to be bound is established for all negotiating states.  Id. 
 62.  Id. art. 12 (detailing state consent by signature); id. art. 13 (detailing state consent by ex-
change of instruments constituting a treaty); id. art. 14 (detailing state consent by ratification, ac-
ceptance, or approval); id. art. 15 (detailing state consent by accession). 
 63.  Id. arts. 7, 8. 
 64.  Id. art. 19 (detailing formulation of reservations by states); id. art. 20 (detailing acceptance 
of reservations); id. art. 21 (detailing the legal effect of reservations); id. art. 22 (detailing the with-
drawal of reservations). 
 65.  Id. art. 39. 
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amendment and be allowed to take part in the negotiation or decision pro-
cess.66  A multilateral treaty can also be amended as to some of the parties 
only.67  And specific treaties may set out more streamlined formal mecha-
nisms for adopting change, for instance through technical annexes or proto-
cols.68 
A treaty’s obligations can be subsequently abrogated.69  The agreement 
can be void due to defects in consent.70  It can be terminated, suspended, or 
withdrawn from according to treaty provisions or with the consent of all par-
ties to the agreement.71  The treaty can be voided, terminated, suspended, or 
withdrawn from due to a conflict with a peremptory norm of general interna-
tional law,72 conflict with a later treaty on the same subject matter,73 material 
breach by one of the parties,74 supervening impossibility of performance,75 
or a “fundamental change of circumstances” unforeseen by the parties.76 
In practice, these mechanisms of change are easy to detect but difficult 
to employ.  Amendment is possible, but the standard mechanism for altering 
the text of a treaty “can quickly become an unachievable negotiating goal.”77  
                                                          
 66.  Id. art. 40. 
 67.  Id. art. 41. 
 68.  See Boockmann & Thurner, supra note 12, at 114 (noting that “many treaties contain their 
own rules by which amendments are facilitated” and that “diversity of amendment rules is high”).  
 69.  Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 42. 
 70.  Id. arts. 48–52. 
 71.  Id. arts. 54, 56–58. 
 72.  Id. art. 53.  A treaty is void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international 
law at the time of its conclusion.  Id.  It is terminated if it conflicts with a new peremptory norm that 
later emerges.  Id. art. 64. 
 73.  Id. art. 59.  Such termination occurs if all the parties to the earlier treaty are also parties to 
the later treaty and if it appears or is established that the parties intended for the later treaty to prevail 
or if the two treaties are so incompatible that they cannot be simultaneously applied.  Id. art. 59(1).  
The earlier treaty is considered only suspended if it appears or is established that the parties so 
intended.  Id. art. 59(2). 
 74.  Id. art. 60.  The non-breaching party can invoke the breach as a ground for termination or 
suspension.  Id. art. 60(1). A material breach is a “repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the 
[Vienna Convention]” or the “violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object 
or purpose of the treaty.”  Id. art. 60(3).   The requirements are somewhat different for bilateral 
treaties than multilateral treaties.  Id. art. 60. 
 75.  Id. art. 61.  Termination or withdrawal is permitted where “the impossibility results from 
the permanent disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the 
treaty.”  Id.  Suspension is permitted if the impossibility is temporary.  Id. 
 76.  Id. art. 62.  Termination or withdrawal is permitted where the changed circumstances both 
were “an essential basis of the consent of the parties” and “radically . . . transform[ed] the extent of 
obligations still be performed.”  Id.  
 77.  McLachlan, supra note 50, at 71; see also Jacob Katz Cogan, Noncompliance and the In-
ternational Rule of Law, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 189, 197 (2006) (“[N]egotiation of a new rule to 
supplant the old rule is possible, but there is no guarantee that such negotiations would end success-
fully (especially in cases of multilateral negotiations where consensus is difficult to achieve) . . . .”); 
Crootof, supra note 10, at 239 (“Formal amendment and treaty supersession require states parties’ 
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This dilemma is particularly so for large-scale multilateral agreements that 
require the consent of many parties.  There are numerous examples of failed 
attempts to update major treaties, even when streamlined formal amendment 
processes are built into the agreement, including the World Trade Organiza-
tion’s (“WTO”) Covered Agreements, protocols under the Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change, and protocols under the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons. 
Treaty termination occurs at an infrequent though steady rate.78  The 
remaining provisions for abrogation are limited to extreme circumstances 
that seldom arise.  The provision on conflict with a later treaty only comes 
into play when it is apparent that the parties intended for the later treaty to 
prevail, or when the two treaties are “so far incompatible” that they cannot 
be simultaneously applied.79  Peremptory norms of international law are few 
and far between, covering only the strongest and most universal norms, such 
as the prohibitions on genocide, slavery, and torture.80  Material breach, im-
possibility of performance, and fundamental change of circumstances are cast 
in similarly restrictive terms.81  The latter doctrine has never been success-
fully asserted in a judicial context, nor is there a clear example of it succeed-
ing in a diplomatic context.82 
B.  Treaty Interpretation 
The difficulty of attaining change through the Convention’s provisions 
on formation, amendment, and abrogation has led to greater attention being 
paid to the Convention’s rules on interpretation.  Exactly how much flexibil-
ity can be afforded by the interpretive rules has been contested in recent 
years.83  In particular, the prevalence of changes in informal implementation 
                                                          
explicit and unanimous consent, which will often be politically or practically infeasible to achieve 
in multilateral treaty regimes.”). 
 78.  Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1606 (2005) (noting that 1547 
denunciations and withdrawals from all multilateral treaties are registered with the United Nations 
(“UN”) from 1945 to 2004, meaning that 3.5% of multilateral agreements concluded after 1945 
have been denounced at least once). 
 79.  Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 59. 
 80.  See id. art. 64.  A peremptory norm of general international law is “a norm accepted and 
recognized by the international community of [s]tates as a whole as a norm from which no deroga-
tion is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law 
having the same character.”  Id. art. 53. 
 81.  See supra notes 74–76; see also Nolte, supra note 16, at 3 (noting that mechanisms such 
as supervening impossibility of performance or fundamental change of circumstances are “rarely 
used”). 
 82.  Helfer, supra note 78, at 1643; see also Cohen, supra note 51, at 90 n.94 (noting examples 
of the ICJ rejecting the invocation of fundamental change of circumstances). 
 83.  See, e.g., GARDINER, supra note 54; ULF LINDERFALK, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF 
TREATIES: THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW AS EXPRESSED IN THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION 
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on the ground in the absence of explicit changes to the treaty itself has led to 
much scholarly writing on a provision that allows subsequent practice to fold 
back into treaty interpretation.84  That scholarship primarily examines the 
published written opinions of prominent international adjudicatory bodies, 
some of which have applied the provision to accommodate more change than 
others. 
The Vienna Convention stipulates that a treaty must be interpreted in 
good faith, according to the ordinary and contextual meaning of its terms, 
and in light of its object and purpose.85  Interpretation must take into account 
any “subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation 
of the treaty or the application of its provisions,” any “subsequent practice in 
the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation,” and any “relevant rules of international law ap-
plicable in the relations between the parties.”86  There is no hierarchy among 
these interpretive principles.  They must all be “thrown into the crucible” and 
carried out as a “single combined operation.”87 
How these interpretive rules contend with the passing of time has been 
the subject of debate.88  One question is whether the “ordinary meaning” of 
terms ought to be pegged to their usage at the time the agreement was made 
(referred to as the principle of contemporaneity89), or if they can shift to re-
                                                          
ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (2007); PANOS MERKOURIS, ARTICLE 31(3)(C) VCLT AND THE PRINCI-
PLE OF SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION: NORMATIVE SHADOWS IN PLATO’S CAVE (2015); Donald H. Re-
gan, Sources of International Trade Law: Understanding What the Vienna Convention Says About 
Identifying and Using “Sources for Treaty Interpretation,” in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE 
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1047 (Samantha Besson & Jean d’Aspremont eds., 2017); 
TREATY INTERPRETATION AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: 30 YEARS 
ON (Malgosia Fitzmaurice et al. eds., 2010).  
 84.  See, e.g., BUGA, supra note 15; TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE, supra note 10; 
U.N. A/73/10, supra note 15, at 11–116; U.N. A/63/10, supra note 15, at 365–89. 
 85.  Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 31.  Context can be gleamed from sources such as 
the treaty’s preamble and annexes.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records: Documents of the Conference, 
at 39, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11/Add.2 (1971) (“All the various elements, as they were present in 
any given case, would be thrown into the crucible, and their interaction would give the legally rel-
evant interpretation.”); see also Georg Nolte, Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice 
and Arbitral Tribunals of Ad Hoc Jurisdiction Relating to Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent 
Practice, in TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 169, 171. 
 88.  See Nolte, supra note 87, at 172 (explaining that while working on “the Draft Articles on 
the Law of Treaties the [International Law] Commission discussed this question of treaty interpre-
tation ‘over time’” but “found that ‘to attempt to formulate a rule covering comprehensively the 
temporal element would present difficulties’”). 
 89.  Even more specifically, scholars debate whether the principle of contemporaneity requires 
a reference to language usage at the time a treaty was negotiated, concluded, or entered into force.  
See GARDINER, supra note 54, at 292–93; MERKOURIS, supra note 83, at 120–22. 
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flect their usage at the time of application (“evolutive” or “dynamic” inter-
pretation90).  Other points of controversy are how to deal with “rules of inter-
national law applicable . . . between the parties” that come into existence at 
a later point in time,91 how to identify and incorporate subsequent agreements 
on interpretation,92 and how to establish and treat agreements on interpreta-
tion based on subsequent practice.  The latter question has been the most di-
visive. 
The language of the provision—requiring that treaties be interpreted 
within the context of “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty 
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation”—
indicates that subsequent practice can be invoked as evidence of an agree-
ment between the parties regarding the treaty’s interpretation.93  Such agree-
ment is most clearly demonstrated when the parties to an agreement engage 
in common and consistent conduct in application of that agreement.94  Not 
                                                          
 90.  See, e.g., Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Judg-
ment, 2009 I.C.J. Rep. 213, ¶¶ 64, 66 (July 13) (applying an evolutive interpretive approach); Iron 
Rhine Railway (Belg. v. Neth.), 27 R.I.A.A. 35, 73 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2005) (finding that “an evolutive 
interpretation, which would ensure an application of the treaty that would be effective in terms of 
its object and purpose, will be preferred to a strict application of the intertemporal rule”); see also 
GARDINER, supra note 54, at 469 (discussing evolutive interpretation); Nolte, supra note 16, at 2 
(discussing evolutive interpretation). 
 91.  See, e.g., Iron Rhine Railway, 27 R.I.A.A. at 66 (taking into account treaty obligations 
subsequently concluded between the parties). 
 92.  “Subsequent agreements” refer to recorded agreements on interpretation, “rang[ing] from 
formal to almost ephemeral,” though not as formal as the treaty itself.  GARDINER, supra note 54, 
at 225; see also Luigi Crema, Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice Within and Outside 
the Vienna Convention, in TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 13, 25 (dis-
cussing non-binding memoranda of understandings as an example of a subsequent agreement); 
Georg Nolte, Jurisprudence Under Special Regimes Relating to Subsequent Agreements and Sub-
sequent Practice, in TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 210, 303 (concluding 
that “adjudicatory bodies have rarely relied on subsequent agreements in the sense of Article 
31(3)(a) VCLT”). 
 93.  Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 31(3)(b); U.N. A/63/10, supra note 15, at 371 (stat-
ing that invocation of subsequent practice should be “limited to elucidating the actual and continuing 
agreement of parties”); see also Julian Arato, Treaty Interpretation and Constitutional Transfor-
mation: Informal Change in International Organizations, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 289, 293 (2013); 
Rahim Moloo, When Actions Speak Louder than Words: The Relevance of Subsequent Party Con-
duct to Treaty Interpretation, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 39, 43 (2013).   
 94.  See GARDINER, supra note 54, at 259 (“[P]ractice requires an element of constancy, a fea-
ture which is reinforced by the context in that subsequent practice must be sufficient to reveal the 
agreement of the parties on interpretation.”); IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE 
LAW OF TREATIES 137 (2d ed. 1984) (“A practice is a sequence of facts or acts and cannot in general 
be established by one isolated fact or act or even by several individual applications.”); Arato, supra 
note 93, at 293 (“Because the goal is establishing the extent of the parties’ mutual consent to be 
bound by an agreement, an authentic practice must entail the consistent practice of all of the par-
ties.”). 
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all parties need to actively engage in the conduct, but the non-engaging par-
ties must acquiesce in the concordant practice of others.95  Beyond these gen-
eral tenets, there is much disagreement on what counts as subsequent prac-
tice; how specific, clear, and consistent a practice needs to be to establish 
agreement; whose application beyond those of state parties matters; and how 
explicitly related practice must be to a treaty to quality as practice in its ap-
plication.96 
Analysis of subsequent practice focuses predominantly on written adju-
dicatory opinions,97 which have employed the provision in conflicting ways.  
The WTO’s adjudicatory bodies, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, and 
the tribunals of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes (“ICSID”) have taken narrow, restrained approaches.98  They tend to 
place the burden of proof on the party appealing to subsequent practice and 
require a robust showing of common and consistent conduct.99  The WTO’s 
Dispute Settlement Body (“WTO DSB”) demands that the subsequent prac-
tice reflect “the considered view of the parties to the treaty,” imposes a high 
threshold for inferring acquiescence from silence, and disregards practice that 
is contradicted or opposed by other parties.100 
By contrast, other adjudicatory bodies have been more eager to accom-
modate change.  The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has based treaty 
interpretation not only on the subsequent practice of parties, but also on the 
subsequent practice of United Nations (“UN”) bodies and organs.101  The 
ICJ’s advisory opinion on the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weap-
ons in Armed Conflict considered institutional practice without tying it to an 
                                                          
 95.  GARDINER, supra note 54, at 254 (“[T]o amount to an ‘authentic interpretation,’ the prac-
tice must be such as to indicate that the interpretation has received the tacit assent of the parties 
generally.”); MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW 
OF TREATIES 431 (2009) (confirming that this provision requires the active practice of only some 
of the parties); Julian Arato, Subsequent Practice and Evolutive Interpretation: Techniques of 
Treaty Interpretation over Time and Their Diverse Consequences, 9 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRI-
BUNALS 443, 460 (2010) (noting the perennial problem of identifying such acquiescence). 
 96.  See BUGA, supra note 15, at 23–75 (discussing complexities in each of these elements); 
U.N. A/73/10, supra note 15, at 11–116 (laying out the International Law Commission’s most recent 
conclusions on some of these questions). 
 97.  DJEFFAL, supra note 10, at 5 (“The research on interpretative practice is limited to the 
practice of international courts.”); GARDINER, supra note 54, at 12 (“[I]t seems likely that the ac-
counts of the practice of many international courts and tribunals may prove to be the most helpful 
guide to understanding the Vienna rules and to their use in connection with new issues of interpre-
tation that arise.”); Nolte, supra note 87, at 170 (“The jurisprudence of the International Court of 
Justice and that of arbitral tribunals of ad hoc jurisdiction are the traditional authoritative sources 
for the elucidation of the legal effects of subsequent agreement and practice.”). 
 98.  Nolte, supra note 92, at 303–05 (noting that WTO DSB and ICSID tribunals establish a 
significant burden of proof for the side invoking subsequent practice); Arato, supra note 93, at 294. 
 99.  Nolte, supra note 92, at 304–05. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  See infra notes 105–112 and accompanying text. 
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agreement among state parties or even full awareness of that practice among 
state parties.102  Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) 
has examined “social practice” and the practice of private and organizational 
actors in implementing human rights treaties.103  The ECHR does not require 
full consensus, treating the subsequent practice of a “vast majority” of state 
actors or a “near consensus” as sufficient for influencing interpretation, even 
when that practice is contradicted.104 
Subsequent practice has even been employed to support a treaty inter-
pretation that strains or contradicts the plain meaning of the text.  The result 
is a functional treaty “modification”—a term used by the UN’s International 
Law Commission to denote “where the parties by common consent in fact 
apply the treaty in a manner which its provisions do not envisage,”105 thereby 
circumventing the formal procedures for amendment.106  The ICJ employed 
subsequent practice in this way in two of its advisory opinions based on in-
stitutional practices: Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory (“Wall”) and Legal Consequences for State 
of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (“Namibia”).107  In Na-
mibia, the ICJ examined Article 27(3) of the UN Charter, which requires that 
non-procedural decisions of the Security Council108 be made “by an affirma-
tive vote of nine members, including the concurring votes of the permanent 
                                                          
 102.  Legality of Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. Rep. 66, ¶ 27 (July 8) (considering resolutions of the WHO’s Health Assembly, a report of 
the Director-General, and a report of the Management Group as evidence of practice).  But see 
Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 1045, ¶ 74 (Dec. 13) (taking 
a more literal and strict approach to subsequent practice). 
 103.  See Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Subsequent Practice, Practices, and ‘Family-Re-
semblance’: Towards Embedding Subsequent Practice in its Operative Milieu, in TREATIES AND 
SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 53. 
 104.  See Nolte, supra note 92, at 304–05; Arato, supra note 93, at 295. 
 105.  Arato, supra note 93, at 310 (quoting Rec. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 18th Sess., May 4–
July 19, 1966, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1, at 236 (1966)). 
 106.  C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL OR-
GANIZATIONS 54–55 (2d rev. ed. 2005); GARDINER, supra note 54, at 243–45; Arato, supra note 
93, at 309. 
 107.  Legal Consequences of Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 27 (July 9); Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence 
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 
(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16 (June 21). 
 108. The Security Council is the body of the UN tasked with “maintaining international peace 
and security.”  What is the Security Council?, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, 
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/what-security-council (last visited May 10, 2019).  It 
has fifteen members, five of which are permanent (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States) and ten of which are rotating.  Current Members, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
COUNCIL, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/current-members (last visited May 10, 
2019).  
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members.”109  Against this textual backdrop, the ICJ concluded that “concur-
ring votes” includes abstentions based on a “general practice” as evidenced 
by “the proceedings of the Security Council extending over a long period.”110  
In Wall, the ICJ held that Article 12(1) of the UN Charter forbidding the 
General Assembly from making recommendations on matters that are being 
dealt with by the Security Council nonetheless permitted such concurrent ef-
fort because it was the “accepted practice of the General Assembly, as it ha[d] 
evolved.”111  Additionally, both the ICJ and arbitral tribunals have recognized 
that subsequent practice can alter precisely drawn national boundaries.112 
These expansive uses of subsequent practice by international courts and 
tribunals have generated criticism by some scholars, who warn that courts 
and tribunals have stretched this interpretive rule “to the point that its letter 
is disregarded.”113  Decisions at times reference subsequent practice generi-
cally without citing to the Vienna Convention114 or pay “no more than lip 
service”115 to the relevant provision, suggesting that adjudicators are unfa-
miliar with the Vienna Convention rules or invoke them opportunistically.116  
Properly understood, the requisite degree of consistent practice should be dif-
ficult to establish and the scope of change achievable limited by a good faith 
reading of the ordinary meaning of treaty text.117  Moreover, a provision that 
                                                          
 109.  Namibia (South West Africa), 1971 I.C.J. Rep. ¶ 21; see also id. ¶ 22 (noting in particular 
that such a general practice was demonstrated by “presidential rulings and the positions taken by 
members of the Council, in particular its permanent members,” who had “consistently and uni-
formly interpreted the practice of voluntary abstention by a permanent member . . . [as having] been 
generally accepted by Members of the United Nations”). 
 110.  Id. ¶¶ 21–22.  
 111.  Construction of a Wall, 2004 I.C.J. Rep ¶ 28. 
 112.  See, e.g., Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Judgement, 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 6, 23–
36 (June 15); Location of Boundary Markers in Taba Between Egypt and Israel, 20 R.I.A.A. 3, ¶ 
210 (Egyptian-Israeli Joint Comm’n 1988); Decision Regarding Delimitation of Border between 
Eritrea and Ethiopia, 25 R.I.A.A. 85, ¶¶ 3.8–3.10 (Eri.-Eth. Boundary Comm’n 2002). 
 113.  Nolte, supra note 16, at 19; see also Crema, supra  note 92, at 26–27 (arguing that subse-
quent practice has been used and applied by international courts and tribunals considerably beyond 
what the Vienna Convention allows); Marcelo G. Kohen, Keeping Subsequent Agreements and 
Practice in Their Right Limits, in TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 34, 34 
(“There is a temptation to include all sorts of acts performed by parties to the treaty and non-parties 
alike under the umbrella of ‘subsequent practice.’”). 
 114.  See, e.g., Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judg-
ment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶ 46 (Dec. 19); Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and 
Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, 1998 I.C.J. Rep. 275, ¶¶ 61–66 (June 11); 
Maritime Delimitation in Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1993 
I.C.J. Rep. 38, ¶ 28 (June 14) (discussing subsequent practice generically while referencing prac-
tices, including other international treaties on similar issues).  
 115.  GARDINER, supra note 54, at 8. 
 116.  Id. at 8; Crema, supra note 92, at 27. 
 117.  See McLachlan, supra note 50, at 71 (noting that “the scale of state participation in the 
great multilateral treaties can also make it practically impossible to establish from the conduct of 
the states parties themselves the requisite degree of consistent ‘subsequent practice’”); Moloo, supra 
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would have allowed treaties to “be modified . . . by . . . subsequent prac-
tice . . . in [its] application” was removed from an earlier draft of the Vienna 
Convention,118 though the significance of that removal is debated.119 
Other scholars justify the liberal use of subsequent practice as a neces-
sary source of flexibility for updating stagnant treaties and for closing gaps 
between treaty prescriptions and the reality on the ground.120  A few scholars 
have even pushed for a doctrinal change that would give subsequent practice 
a more prominent role in the law of treaties.  Harlan Grant Cohen advocates 
an approach that focuses on the “processes by which rules come to be inter-
nalized by international actors . . . [r]ather than taking for granted that a treaty 
reflects international law.”121  Rebecca Crootof contends that treaties should 
be modifiable by subsequently developed customary international law.122 
Beyond the readily accessible decisions of adjudicatory bodies, little is 
known about the operation of subsequent practice.123  Treaty interpretation 
takes place far more frequently as part of their day-to-day application,124 but 
such routine interpretive decisions are poorly documented and often hidden 
from view unless and until a dispute leads to a legal proceeding before an 
                                                          
note 93, at 87–88 (“The parties’ agreement as to the meaning of the treaty text, however, must still 
be consistent with the ordinary meaning, read in good faith, in context, and in line with its object 
and purpose.”). 
 118.  DJEFFAL, supra note 10, at 42. 
 119.  See BUGA, supra note 15, at 363 (explaining that the draft article was deleted for reasons 
unrelated to whether it reflected the current state of international law, namely that it overlapped with 
other Vienna Convention provisions and that it prompted questions too complex given time con-
straints). 
 120.  See, e.g., id. at 192 (noting that “[t]he practical difficulty (even impossibility) often en-
countered with formal amendment, the premise of pacta sunt servanda, the fluid interchange be-
tween interpretation and modification, and the significance of the contemporaneous intention of the 
parties . . . all reinforce the validity of and need for the process of treaty modification by subsequent 
practice”); Cohen, supra note 51, at 85 (citing “the apparent gap growing between treaties and state 
action and concerns about treaties’ relative inability to adapt quickly enough to a constantly chang-
ing world” as challenges); Sean D. Murphy, The Relevance of Subsequent Agreement and Subse-
quent Practice for the Interpretation of Treaties, in TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE, supra 
note 10, at 82, 87 (“Treaties are cumbersome devices that cannot change quickly . . . .  [W]e may 
be entering a period when greater flexibility in treaty interpretation is needed.”). 
 121.  Cohen, supra note 51, at 71. 
 122.  Crootof, supra note 10, at 239–40. 
 123.  GARDINER, supra note 54, at 12 (recognizing “treaty interpretation is not only undertaken 
in disputes before courts and tribunals . . . but those instances outside case reports are not readily 
accessed or assimilated into clear guidance”); Georg Nolte, Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent 
Practice of States Outside of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Proceedings, in TREATIES AND SUBSE-
QUENT PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 307, 308 (noting the difficulty of describing and assessing sub-
sequent practice in its immediate form due to the lack of published and clearly identifiable records). 
 124.  GARDINER, supra note 54, at 124–25 (“[I]nternationally, issues over treaty interpretation 
will commonly be a matter for discussion, negotiation, and agreement between states or for resolu-
tion with an international organization, with judicial or arbitral determination covering only a small 
minority of cases.”). 
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adjudicatory body.125  Without descriptive studies into how treaties actually 
change, little can be said about the overall role of subsequent practice and 
whether it is properly deployed. 
C.  What is Missing? 
Investigating the dynamism of treaties through the Vienna Convention 
and formal change mechanisms—particularly when limited to easily accessi-
ble and publicly available evidence—generates a partial picture at best.  This 
is echoed by a smattering of largely unconnected observations across inter-
national law scholarship.  Georg Nolte observes, “In most cases, the evolu-
tion of the context of a treaty must be accommodated by more informal 
means.”126  Harold Koh describes modern international law as “fluid and 
messy,” functioning through “nontraditional efforts at legal diplomacy,” and 
requiring analysis beyond treaty language and judicial decisions.127  Janet 
Koven Levit chronicles a process of “[b]ottom-up” lawmaking in interna-
tional trade and finance, whereby “the very practitioners—both public and 
private—who must roll up their sleeves and grapple with the day-to-day tech-
nicalities of their trade” are creating, interpreting, and enforcing rules based 
on their experiences on the ground.128  Laurence Helfer explores the institu-
tional role played by the International Labor Organization in lawmaking ac-
tivities over the course of its long history.129  Each of these studies hint at 
important developments beyond the Vienna Convention, the doctrinal mean-
ing of subsequent practice, and the text and formal implementation of trea-
ties.  Instead, they call for attention to the complex, decentralized, and often-
times opaque world of informal treaty implementation. 
International law scholarship currently lacks tools for understanding 
these informal implementation-level developments in their own right.  Basic 
conceptual and empirical questions have yet to be explored: What are the 
“informal means” by which change is pursued?  Who brings about this type 
of change, under what conditions, and for what purpose?  How prevalent is 
                                                          
 125.  U.N. A/63/10, supra note 15, at 370 (noting that subsequent practice “is not always well-
documented and often only comes to light in legal proceedings”); BUGA, supra note 15, at 6 (noting 
that “[e]xamples of subsequent practice have never been collected in any systematic way”); see also 
Anthea Roberts, Subsequent Agreements and Practice: The Battle over Interpretive Power, in 
TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 95, 97 (observing that routine interpretive 
decisions rarely give rise to disputes and are unlikely to do so precisely where subsequent practice 
is consistent and thus a proper use of the interpretive rule). 
 126.  Nolte, supra note 16, at 3. 
 127.  Harold Hongju Koh, Address: Twenty-First-Century International Lawmaking, 101 GEO. 
L.J. ONLINE 1, 14, 18 (2012). 
 128.  Levit, supra note 32, at 126. 
 129.  Helfer, supra note 32. 
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this type of change, and what is its relationship to the more formal mecha-
nisms of change within the Vienna Convention? 
The next Part draws insights about the role of informal implementation 
in the dynamism of domestic contracts, statutes, and institutions.  Part III 
presents a framework for understanding informal implementation dynamism 
in treaties based on vignettes from the history of international infectious dis-
ease regulation. 
II.  INSIGHTS FROM DOMESTIC ANALOGUES 
Treaties have been analogized to contracts130 and statutes131 and de-
scribed as a type of institution.132  In each area, using language particular to 
each field, scholars have examined how change arises.  This Part highlights 
common themes in how the informal implementation of contracts,133 stat-
utes,134 and institutions135 contributes to their evolution over time.  Although 
not discussed in this Article, a similar strand of scholarship exists with re-
spect to amending national constitutions.  In particular, the difficulty of 
changing the U.S. Constitution under Article V procedures has led to reliance 
on more feasible, alternative change mechanisms such as by judicial deci-
sion-making or statute.136 
Scholarship on each analogue suggests that examining the everyday, in-
formal dynamics of implementers on the ground reveals change not apparent 
or foreseeable from the written covenant itself.  Implementation change tends 
to be slow-moving but can add up across time, leading not only to extensions 
but also to contradictions of covenant language.  Over the course of long-
                                                          
 130.  See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 581 (1832) (M’Lean, J., concurring) (“What 
is a treaty?  The answer is, it is a compact formed between two nations or communities, having the 
right of self government.”); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829) (“A treaty is in its nature a 
contract between two nations, not a legislative act.”); see also Curtis J. Mahoney, Treaties as Con-
tracts: Textualism, Contract Theory, and the Interpretation of Treaties, 116 YALE L.J. 824, 826 
(2007); Robert E. Scott & Paul B. Stephan, Self-Enforcing International Agreements and the Limits 
of Coercion, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 551, 556 (2004). 
 131.  See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (“By the Constitution a treaty 
is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation.”); see also 
Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 701 n.52 (1998) 
(noting that “[t]reaties are of the same constitutional dignity as statutes”). 
 132.  See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 401 
(2000) (“‘Legalization’ refers to a particular set of characteristics that institutions may (or may not) 
possess.”). 
 133.  See infra Section II.A. 
 134.  See infra Section II.B. 
 135.  See infra Section II.C. 
 136.  See e.g., David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 1457, 1459 (2001) (arguing that the U.S. Constitution “would look the same today if Article 
V of the Constitution had never been adopted and the Constitution contained no provision for formal 
amendment” because of reliance on more achievable means of change instead). 
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term contracts or due to legislative inertia, informal implementation can stray 
from the written covenant in unexpected ways and reveal information that 
informs subsequent rewrites. 
A.  Contracts 
During the 1980s, relational contract theorists such as Ian Macneil ob-
served that contractual relationships are, in practice, more dynamic than pre-
viously considered.137  They called into question earlier depictions of con-
tracts as discrete, one-time, “spot” interactions between strangers,138 intro-
ducing instead a “relational” model in which contracts govern repeat interac-
tions over long periods of time between parties in ongoing relationships.139  
Due to the duration and complexity of “relational contracts,”140 they typically 
are not fully planned at the front-end and require greater flexibility at the 
back-end.141  Relational contract theorists, therefore, are less focused on the 
single instant of contract formation and more attentive to the dynamic pro-
cesses by which contractual relationships evolve over time: “[A] contract is 
partly what it was at the time of contract formation and partly what it becomes 
thereafter.”142 
A number of authors have noted similarities between relational contracts 
and treaties that govern the repeat, long-term interactions between states.143  
As in the treaty context where scholars have sought greater flexibility in the 
Vienna Convention’s interpretive rules, contract scholars too have pushed for 
                                                          
 137.  See generally IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN 
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980); Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and 
Queries, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 877 (2000). 
 138.  See Macneil, supra note 137, at 884; Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristics and Chal-
lenges of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 823, 823 (2000). 
 139.  Scholars disagree on which specific characteristics define a “relational contract.”  See, e.g., 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There Is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 814, 
816 (2000) (defining a relational contract as one “that involves not merely an exchange, but also a 
relationship, between the contracting parties” and noting that “the phrase ‘long-term contracts’ has 
become virtually a synonym for relational contracts”).  But see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, 
Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (1981) (arguing that “[a] contract is 
relational to the extent that the parties are incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement 
to well-defined obligations.”). 
 140.  Most agree that relational contracts are not a subset of contracts, but that all contracts are 
relational to different degrees.  See Macneil, supra note 137, at 896 (“[L]ike the ends of rainbows, 
the ends of the relational/as-if-discrete spectrum are mythical.”). 
 141.  Goetz & Scott, supra note 139, at 1090–92; Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of 
Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 
NW. U. L. REV. 854, 865 (1978); see also Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational 
Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 847, 862 (2000). 
 142.  Eisenberg, supra note 139, at 810. 
 143.  See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 130, at 827; Jared Wessel, Relational Contract Theory and 
Treaty Interpretation: End-Game Treaties v. Dynamic Obligations, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
149, 150 (2004). 
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more flexible rules on contract interpretation.144  Some argue that courts 
should consider a broader range of sources to divine the intention of the par-
ties and be given wider latitude to adjust contracts after formation.  They 
could, for instance, rely on implied terms, such as covenants of good faith 
and fair dealing, that require looking beyond the four corners of the agree-
ment.145  Others are skeptical that courts have the competence to understand 
complex and evolving relationships between parties, and therefore advocate 
a more passive judicial role.146 
In practice, the scholarship on relational contracts has had limited im-
pact on judicial decision-making.147  That limited impact might not be sur-
prising since relational contract theory itself downplays the role of formal 
adjudication.  Resorting to legal sanctions can harm the underlying relation-
ship,148 while other sanctions of a political or social nature are available in 
the context of continuing interdependence.149  Stewart Macaulay’s empirical 
work suggests that lawsuits are rarely brought for breaches of contract.150  
Instead, adjustments are made and disputes resolved in ways unforeseen by 
the contract, or in outright contradiction of the contract, as part of the “give-
and-take” needed to maintain business relations.151  This process of ongoing 
adaptation is “administrative” and can lead to “glacial[]” change through the 
accumulation of “small-scale, day-to-day adjustments.”152 
 Not only can contracts change in unexpected ways as gaps emerge 
between party behavior and the terms of the written agreement, but they are 
                                                          
 144.  See Eisenberg, supra note 139; Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Condi-
tions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749, 751 (2000). 
 145.  See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model 
of Decentralized Law, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 215, 215–16 (1994) (arguing that courts should, 
under some circumstances, resolve contractual disputes by applying prevailing commercial cus-
toms); Goetz & Scott, supra note 139, at 1091, 1114 (arguing that courts should fill the gaps in 
relational contracts with whichever terms would maximize the value of the contractual relationship); 
Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 NW. 
U. L. REV. 369, 404–05 (1981); Speidel, supra note 138, at 836 (arguing for a more sophisticated 
duty of good faith). 
 146.  See, e.g., Posner, supra note 144, at 754; Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the 
Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 274 
(1992). 
 147.  Speidel, supra note 138, at 824.  But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
202(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 148.  Wessel, supra note 143, at 155. 
 149.  Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465, 468 (1985) 
(discussing “relational sanctions”). 
 150.  Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. 
SOC. REV. 55, 61, 65 (1963) (suggesting that the written contract is not as important or may serve 
other purposes such as “a communication device within a large corporation”). 
 151.  Id. at 61. 
 152.  Macneil, supra note 141, at 895, 901. 
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rarely formulated from a blank slate in the first place.153  Over time, contracts 
may be renegotiated to incorporate adjustments made and information gath-
ered through the process of translating contracts into reality.  Scholars stud-
ying the evolution of supply-chain contracts propose a cyclical model in 
which: (1) parties make contractual commitments based on limited infor-
mation and cognitive shortcomings; (2) parties engage in a process of dy-
namic learning over the duration of the contract as they develop knowledge 
about operations, relationship management, and respective strengths and 
weaknesses; and (3) parties renegotiate their contractual relationship based 
on their dynamic learning.154  A longitudinal case study of the contractual 
relationship between a Norwegian railway and its catering service provider 
concludes that contractual relationships are dynamic and that the parties’ 
ability to manage the evolutionary process is critical to achieving long-term 
benefits.155 
B.  Statutes 
Since the 1980s, scholars such as William Eskridge, Ronald Dworkin, 
Alexander Aleinikoff, and Daniel Farber have argued that statutory interpre-
tation “is, and should be, dynamic,” rather than moored to the enacting Con-
gress’ historical intent.156  They use the term “interpretation” broadly, exam-
ining all players involved in the translation of statutes into reality.  Under-
stood in this way, “interpretation” is similar to how I use the term “imple-
mentation,” as explained in Part III. 
Eskridge posits that statutory interpretation is “multifaceted and evolu-
tive.”157  The exercise of statutory interpretation is not an archaeological 
quest to discover historical meaning.  It is a creative enterprise to assign cur-
rent meaning to a text that omits politically unresolved issues, overlooks un-
anticipated issues, and encounters resistance in its integration into society.158  
It is multifaceted in that it involves many actors, each with their own values 
and visions.  Interpretation shifts whenever the interpreter’s perspective dif-
fers from that of the statute.159 
                                                          
 153.  Stephen J. Choi et al., The Dynamics of Contract Evolution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013) 
(describing contract production as “path-dependent,” as drafters “take existing products and try to 
improve them so that they can meet the clients’ needs at hand”). 
 154.  Tim Coltman et al., Supply Chain Contract Evolution, 27 EUR. MGMT. J. 388, 390–91 
(2009). 
 155.  Id. at 392, 398. 
 156.  William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 
101 YALE L.J. 331, 390 & n.178 (1991). 
 157.  WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 48 (1994). 
 158.  Id. at 51; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 
1479, 1482, 1498 (1987). 
 159.  ESKRIDGE, supra note 157, at 11, 49. 
 
2019] THE DYNAMISM OF TREATIES 853 
Matthew Christiansen and Eskridge describe statutory interpretation as 
a “dynamic game” that is sequential, hierarchical, and ongoing over time.160  
Each interpreter occupies a “strategic position” and must anticipate and re-
spond to the preferences of others.161  Interpretation begins at the “retail 
level” with those at whom the statute is directed: private citizens, communi-
ties of interpretation, interest groups, low-level bureaucrats in administrative 
agencies, and other ground-level implementers.162  These front-line interpret-
ers are the most sensitive to changing circumstances, needs, and ideas.  Retail 
interpretations then work their way to the “wholesalers”: agency heads and 
the Supreme Court.163  Finally, the sitting Congress can override the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation with new legislation that restores what it considers to 
be the correct interpretation or that updates outdated statutory schemes with 
new policies.164  The cycle then begins anew.  Interpretation, therefore, oc-
curs “everywhere all the time, with no one interpreter having the final word 
on what a statute means.”165 
Administrative agencies are particularly well-positioned to drive change 
in this dynamic and cyclical game.166  At the outset, agencies lobby for and 
help draft legislation, or at least testify on the subject during legislative hear-
ings.167  Most statutes, in turn, are delegations to agencies,168 making them 
responsible for rulemaking and enforcement as well as the bulk of adjudica-
tion.169  In each of these functions, agencies tend to be responsive to changing 
circumstances and patterns of violations due to their ground-level involve-
ment in implementation.  There are many examples of agencies drastically 
                                                          
 160.  Eskridge, supra note 156, at 334; Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. 
L. REV. 1317 (2014).  
 161.  See John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 
12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 263, 263, 276 (1992); see also Eskridge, supra note 156, at 334. 
 162.  ESKRIDGE, supra note 157, at 69; Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 160, at 1372; Fere-
john & Weingast, supra note 161, at 263. 
 163.  ESKRIDGE, supra note 157, at 69. 
 164.  Id. at 11, 49; Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 160, at 1320. 
 165.  ESKRIDGE, supra note 157, at 70. 
 166.  Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 160, at 1321. 
 167.  See Edward Rubin, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, in 2 IS-
SUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, art. 2, at 4 (2002); Lisa 
Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study 
of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN L. REV. 725, 767 (2014). 
 168.  Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 
549, 551 (1985).   
 169.  Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency Statutory Interpretation, in 2 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: 
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 167, art. 9, at 9; Rubin, supra note 167, at 2.  
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updating policies without statutory basis or judicial rebuke over the last few 
decades.170 
Statutory interpretation is particularly dynamic when the statute is old 
and the original assumptions and expectations underlying the policy have 
been overtaken by later developments.  This lapse in time—usually due to 
legislative inertia—is doubly significant because new information emerges 
over time, leading to learning and potentially altered policy preferences on 
the part of various interpreters.171  The degree of elasticity in statutory mean-
ing can be extremely broad: Statutes can evolve not only beyond their lan-
guage and original legislative intent but also against them.172  Such evolution 
and learning can, in turn, inform subsequent legislative overrides, whether 
for the purpose of restoring or updating. 
C.  Institutions 
Political scientists and sociologists have theorized about the genesis and 
evolution of domestic legal and political institutions.173  “Institution” is de-
fined as formalized obligatory rules, typically involving rights and obliga-
tions that “may be enforced by calling upon a third party.”174  Prior scholar-
ship on punctuated equilibrium and path dependence drew a sharp distinction 
between the sudden innovation and upheaval that occurs when institutions 
are created, radically reorganized, or dismantled and the prolonged periods 
of relative stability in between.175  More recently, authors such as Kathleen 
Thelen and Wolfgang Streeck have argued that such frameworks overlook 
                                                          
 170.  See, e.g., Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 160, at 1478 (discussing examples of regu-
latory agencies that have radically changed regulatory policies, including the Federal Energy Reg-
ulatory Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Food and Drug Administration, 
the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Patent Office).  
 171.  Eskridge, supra note 156, at 379. 
 172.  See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 
281, 282 (1989). 
 173.  See e.g., JAMES MAHONEY & KATHLEEN THELEN, EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: 
AMBIGUITY, AGENCY, AND POWER (2010); KATHLEEN THELEN, HOW INSTITUTIONS EVOLVE: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SKILLS IN GERMANY, BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES, AND JAPAN (2004); 
T.J. PEMPEL, REGIME SHIFT: COMPARATIVE DYNAMICS OF THE JAPANESE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
(1998); BEYOND CONTINUITY: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN ADVANCED POLITICAL ECONOMIES 
(Wolfgang Streeck & Kathleen Thelen eds., 2005). 
 174.  Wolfgang Streeck & Kathleen Thelen, Introduction: Institutional Change in Advance Po-
litical Economies, in BEYOND CONTINUITY, supra note 173, at 1, 10.  “Institution” is distinguished 
from informal norms such as mores and customs, and from voluntary social interactions in which 
breach of an expectation leads only to strategic responses by those affected.  Id. at 9–12. 
 175.  See, e.g., Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective, 21 COMP. POL. 
STUD. 66, 77–80 (1988) (discussing the punctuated equilibrium model of institutional change); Ann 
Swidler, Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 273, 278–82 (1986) (drawing 
a distinction between “unsettled” times when social transformation and new cultural complexes are 
possible and “settled” times). 
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gradual yet significant institutional developments.176  They set out to rethink 
what constitutes change and how it can be detected in the absence of overt 
disruption to formalized rules. 
Historical studies of key domestic institutions governing the political 
economies of select countries reveal that immense transformations can result 
from gradual, incremental adjustments to the implementation of the very in-
stitutions that are being reformed or dissolved.177  This gradual change orig-
inates from the normal yet contested “everyday implementation and enact-
ment of an institution.”178  Rules are put into action by an array of actors with 
divergent interests engaged in an ongoing struggle to shape the rules’ mean-
ing.179  Some of these actors are rule-makers who set the rules; others are 
rule-takers who are expected to comply with obligations.180  Some may favor 
a sincere application of the rule in good will; others may try to revise or cir-
cumvent the rule in the process of implementation.  The sum of their interac-
tions gives rise to a “continuous probing of the boundary between the legal 
and the illegal” as new interpretations are invented and tested.181  No single 
actor controls this process, which can open an unpredictable gap between the 
institution as designed by its creators and the actual behavior put in motion 
underneath it.  Over time, the gap may widen with far-reaching implica-
tions.182 
Because this type of change occurs through the mechanics of an institu-
tion’s everyday implementation, complications arising from that process—
problems with interpretation, implementation, enforcement, and compli-
ance—are windows of opportunity for change.  These everyday problems 
uncover ambiguities and open up space for existing rules to be administered 
or extended in novel ways.183  Change often results from skirmishing, as im-
plementers with different preferences struggle to resolve implementation 
problems in their own favor. 
                                                          
 176.  See MAHONEY & THELEN, supra note 173, at 4; THELEN, supra note 173; Streeck & The-
len, supra note 174, at 8–9. 
 177.  Their case studies focus predominantly on wealthy, Western democracies such as the 
United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan.  For example, they examine the trans-
formation of national institutions during the 1980s and 1990s to become increasingly capitalist.  
Streeck & Thelen, supra note 174, at 2–4. 
 178.  Id. at 11 (emphasis omitted). 
 179.  See Jack Knight, Explaining the Rise of Neoliberalism: The Mechanisms of Institutional 
Change, in THE RISE OF NEOLIBERALISM AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 20 (John L. Campbell & 
Ove K. Pedersen eds., 1999) (describing institutional development as “a contest among actors to 
establish rules which structure outcomes to those equilibria most favorable to them”). 
 180.  Streeck & Thelen, supra note 174, at 13. 
 181.  Id. at 15. 
 182.  Id. at 8; PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANAL-
YSIS 13 (2004) (“Some causal processes and outcomes occur slowly because they are incremental—
it simply takes a long time for them to add up to anything.”). 
 183.  MAHONEY & THELEN, supra note 173, at 4. 
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Gradual change of this kind tends to be subtler and may be difficult to 
detect until it becomes fully apparent in hindsight.  This delayed effect calls 
for longitudinal studies tracing, over time, the contestation between various 
actors to implement rules in their preferred way.  Based on such studies, 
scholars propose that there are a handful of analytically distinct modes of 
gradual institutional change.184  I do not discuss them here, but I draw on 
them below in examining the strategies for implementation dynamism.185 
III.  INFORMAL IMPLEMENTATION DYNAMISM 
Having highlighted some common themes in how the everyday imple-
mentation of domestic contracts, statutes, and institutions contributes to their 
evolution over time, I return to the subject of treaties.  This Part shines a 
spotlight on what I call “informal implementation dynamism”: change that 
stems from the ongoing, everyday process of implementing a treaty on the 
ground.  I understand implementation to encompass all the events and activ-
ities mobilized in translating a treaty into action186—including some measure 
of interpretation to give meaning to treaty text.  Implementers are all the ac-
tors who have a hand in or wield influence over these events and activities.  I 
focus on informal implementation dynamism, meaning changes in practice 
that are not accompanied by official change under the rules of the Vienna 
Convention or the rules of the treaty at issue, or official acts of implementa-
tion by state parties.187 
                                                          
 184.  See id. at 15–18; Streeck & Thelen, supra note 174, at 18–30. 
 185.  See infra Section III.C. 
 186.  This definition follows that of other prominent authors writing about implementation.  See 
David G. Victor et al., Introduction and Overview, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS 
OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1, 4 (David G. 
Victor et al. eds., 1998) (defining implementation as “the process by which ‘intent gets translated 
into action’” and “those events and activities that occur after the issuing of authoritative public 
policy directives, which include the effort to administer and the substantive impacts on people and 
events” (first quoting Martin Rein & Francine Rabinowitz, Implementation: A Theoretical Perspec-
tive, in AMERICAN POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 308 (Walter Dean Burnham & Martha Wagner 
Weinberg eds., 1987); and then quoting DANIEL A. MAZMANIAN & PAUL A. SABATIER, IMPLEMEN-
TATION AND PUBLIC POLICY (1983))). 
 187.  My usage of the term “informal” is similar to Laurence Helfer’s usage.  Helfer distin-
guishes “formal” flexibility mechanisms, such as reservations, escape clauses, and withdrawal pro-
visions that are “incorporate[ed] . . . into . . . multilateral and bilateral agreements,” from “informal” 
flexibility mechanisms, such as de facto modifications through conduct, auto-interpretation, and 
withholding of financial support.  Helfer, supra note 12, at 176, 177.  By contrast, other scholars 
use “informal” to characterize the form of an international agreement, the process by which it was 
reached, or the actors involved.  The form of the agreement can range from an intricate written 
document to an exchange of notes, a joint communiqué, an oral or tacit bargain, or a norm.  The 
process can range from the elaborate procedures of a traditional intergovernmental organization and 
domestic procedures for consent and ratification to those employed by a loosely organized network.  
The actors involved can range from those typically involved in diplomacy (heads of state, foreign 
ministries, and embassies) to other branches, lower level bureaucracies, or sub-federal entities.  See, 
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The process of implementing a treaty on the ground is akin to a strategic 
game that takes place over time, as implementers—including those unsatis-
fied with the treaty as negotiated—jostle to implement the treaty according 
to their own preferences.  I map the range of implementers engaged in this 
game—including countries, international organizations, and epistemic com-
munities—and highlight the importance of looking inside institutions and bu-
reaucracies to understand how front-line decisions about informal implemen-
tation are made.  I characterize three key strategies implementers might pur-
sue to drive or forestall change: (1) converting the treaty from within through 
altered practice; (2) eroding the treaty through neglect or actively resisting 
adaptation in the face of drifting circumstances; and (3) shifting to another 
institutional option to solve the underlying problem. 
Relying on insights from domestic analogues and vignettes from the his-
tory of international infectious disease regulation, I argue that informal im-
plementation dynamism is important, yet easily overlooked.  It is important 
because informal change via implementation can be a more accessible alter-
native to the formal avenues of change set out in the Vienna Convention or 
in the treaty itself.  Its impact over time can be transformative both on the 
ground and as a precursor to revision of the treaty at a later time.  It is easily 
overlooked because it is often subtler in form, smaller in scale, and its docu-
mentation less publicly available.  Informal implementation dynamism may 
be difficult to detect as it is occurring, and its influence may not be evident 
except in hindsight. 
I develop and illustrate this Part through historical examples from the 
international regulation of infectious disease—an area that is exceptional in 
some ways, but illustrates clearly patterns that have been observed elsewhere 
as well.188  In an effort to control the cross-border spread of epidemics while 
limiting interference with international trade and traffic, states convened con-
ferences and concluded a series of conventions beginning in the nineteenth 
century.  Those conferences and conventions eventually led to the formation 
of the first international health organization in 1907,189 which was absorbed 
into the WHO at its establishment following World War II in 1948.  The 
earlier conventions were consolidated, renamed, and updated under the 
WHO’s auspices.  Infectious disease is thus one of the oldest continuous ar-
eas of international regulation, persisting to this day. 
                                                          
e.g., Joost Pauwelyn et al., An Introduction to Informal International Lawmaking, in INFORMAL 
INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 1, 3 (Joost Pauwelyn et al. eds., 2012); Charles Lipson, Why are 
Some International Agreements Informal?, 45 INT’L. ORG. 495, 495–501 (1991). 
 188.  See infra Part IV. 
 189.  The International Office of Public Hygiene (Office International d’Hygiène Publique) was 
founded in Paris for the purpose of overseeing the then-existing conventions on infectious disease 
regulation.  See GOODMAN, supra note 17. 
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The particular examples I discuss deal with the emergence and recent 
evolution of the now-in-force 2005 IHR.  One of the most widely subscribed 
to instruments of international law,190 the 2005 IHR came into effect for most 
state parties in 2007191 and governed recent high-profile outbreaks such as 
Ebola and Zika.  Although called a revision, the 2005 IHR is widely consid-
ered “[a] revolution in the governance of global infectious disease.”192  It not 
only updated the prior 1969 IHR but also introduced an entirely new ap-
proach to infectious disease control. 
The old “barrier approach” under the 1969 IHR193 covered only a hand-
ful of specific infectious diseases,194 while relying solely on self-reporting by 
state parties to track epidemics.195  The overall objective was to prevent the 
movement of the covered diseases across national borders.  By contrast, the 
“epidemiological approach” under the 2005 IHR covers “all events which 
may constitute a public health emergency of international concern.”196  The 
epidemiological approach establishes a broader and more active surveillance 
system managed by the WHO197 that relies heavily on internet surveillance 
tools.198  The overall objective is the rapid detection and swift control of ep-
idemics at their source with unprecedented requirements for state parties to 
develop their internal public health capacities.199 
On the surface, examined through the lens of formal change mecha-
nisms, the transformation from the 1969 IHR to the 2005 IHR began in 1995 
                                                          
 190.  The 2005 IHR currently has 196 state parties.  States Parties to the International Health 
Regulations (2005), WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/ihr/legal_issues/states_parties/en/ 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Fidler, supra note 20, at 799. 
 193.  While the details changed over time, the barrier approach persisted from the beginning of 
international infectious disease cooperation in the mid-nineteenth century until the 1969 IHR.  It 
extended across numerous agreements and several international health institutions, culminating in 
the 1969 IHR under the WHO’s auspices.  Wang, supra note 28, at 17. 
 194.  “The specific diseases covered varied over time” and at different points “included cholera, 
plague, yellow fever, typhus, relapsing fever, and smallpox.”  Id.  Prior to the adoption of the 2005 
IHR, the 1969 IHR covered cholera, plague, and yellow fever.  See 1969 IHR, supra note 19. 
 195.  1969 IHR, supra note 19, arts. 3–7. 
 196.  2005 IHR, supra note 18, arts. 6(1), 9. 
 197.  Id. art. 5(4) (requiring the WHO to “collect information regarding events through its sur-
veillance activities”). 
 198.  Director-General, WHO, Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005): 
Report of the Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health Regulations (2005) 
in Relation to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, at 72–73, WHO Doc. A64/10 (May 5, 2011) (noting that 
thirty-five percent of initial outbreak information came from open sources in 2009 and that internet 
surveillance tools, such as ProMED and the Global Public Health Intelligence Network, are used 
for “international epidemic intelligence”). 
 199.  2005 IHR, supra note 18, annex 1. 
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with a WHO resolution delegating the organization’s staff to prepare an up-
date for the old law.200  Prior to 1995, the 1969 IHR appeared superficially 
stable: The cholera provisions were slightly adjusted in 1973 and smallpox 
was taken off of the list of reportable diseases due to its eradication in 
1981.201  The 1995 resolution led to three weeks of intergovernmental nego-
tiations in 2004 and 2005, and the new law was adopted in May 2005.202  The 
ensuing illustrative examples dig below this superficial narrative to uncover 
an entirely different story: The transformation in fact began decades earlier 
as the 1969 IHR triggered persistent disagreement about how infectious dis-
eases should be governed; changes originated in the very implementation of 
the old law that was gradually being overridden; and entrepreneurial imple-
menters tested the policies underlying the 2005 IHR on the ground, which in 
turn facilitated the law’s subsequent enactment.  A final example looks at the 
evolution of one aspect of the 2005 IHR’s implementation since it came into 
effect. 
A.  The Game 
Treaties can change through the everyday process by which they are 
informally implemented on the ground.  Implementation is a source of dyna-
mism because contestation over what an international agreement should be 
does not end the moment it is negotiated.  Rather, it extends into the treaty’s 
implementation as a host of implementers, each motivated by their own in-
terests and ideas for how the treaty should work, engage in a strategic game 
to move the treaty in the direction they favor.203  The implementation game 
                                                          
 200.  World Health Assembly Res. 48.7, supra note 25.  There is universal accord in the litera-
ture on the 2005 IHR that it originates with this resolution.  See, e.g., Obijiofor Aginam, Globaliza-
tion of Infectious Diseases, International Law and the World Health Organization: Opportunities 
for Synergy in Global Governance of Epidemics, 11 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 59, 69 (2004); 
Michael G. Baker & David P. Fidler, Global Public Health Surveillance Under New International 
Health Regulations, 12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1058, 1058 (2006); David Bishop, Les-
sons from SARS: Why the WHO Must Provide Greater Economic Incentives for Countries to Com-
ply with International Health Regulations, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1173, 1175 (2005); David P. Fidler 
& Lawrence O. Gostin, The New International Health Regulations: An Historic Development for 
International Law and Public Health, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 85 (2006). 
 201.  See WHO, International Health Regulations (2005) 1 (3d ed. 2016) [hereinafter 2005 IHR 
(3d ed. 2016)], http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/246107/9789241580496-
eng.pdf?sequence=1. 
 202.  World Health Assembly Res. 58.3, Revision of the International Health Regulations, at 2, 
WHO Doc. A58/VR/8 (May 23, 2005). 
 203.  Following other authors’ writing about domestic statutes, I use the analogy of a game met-
aphorically, not in the game theory sense.  See supra Section II.B; see also Daniel Peat & Matthew 
Windsor, Playing the Game of Interpretation: On Meaning and Metaphor in International Law, in 
INTERPRETATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 28 (Andrea Bianchi et al. eds., 2015) (similarly de-
scribing treaty interpretation metaphorically as a “game” in which the players deploy “rhetorical 
strategies” to “secure adherence to their preferred interpretation”). 
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is played not only by strategizing within the ambiguities of the existing agree-
ment, but also by pushing the boundary between what the law condones or 
authorizes and what it does not, blocking change to promote the treaty’s at-
trition and seeking opportunities to move management of the underlying 
problem away from the treaty and toward a more favorable institutional op-
tion.  For the proponents of change who are unsatisfied with the treaty as 
negotiated, these may be more accessible ways to chip away at the compro-
mise that was struck. 
Political economist Carolyn Deere describes this dynamic at work in the 
context of the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (“TRIPS”).  She wrote that the negotiated agreement “left 
both proponents and detractors dissatisfied, provoking post-agreement ef-
forts from both sides to revise the contested text, sway its interpretation, and 
influence how it was implemented.”204  She described TRIPS implementation 
as a “complex political game” that is closely connected to debates about pos-
sible revisions to the treaty text.205 
That same dynamic was at work in the early history of the 1969 IHR, 
when there were conflicting perspectives on the nature and importance of the 
infectious disease threat.  On the one hand, domestic public health reforms, 
improvements in water sanitation, and medical discoveries such as antibiotics 
and vaccines created a sense of optimism in developed countries.  In 1967, 
the Surgeon General of the United States, William H. Stewart, famously de-
clared that “the war against infectious diseases has been won.”206  On the 
other hand, patterns of infectious disease spread were shifting due to in-
creased air travel, new interactions between humans and the environment, 
and new transformations in human demography and behavior.  In 1976, 
American academic William McNeill warned that pathogens were a perpet-
ual threat against which continued vigilance was necessary.207 
These perspectives gave rise to disagreement over the 1969 laws, which 
was a barely-altered update to the 1951 International Sanitary Regulations 
(“1951 ISR”).208  In the course of implementing these laws, new patterns in 
infectious disease spread were uncovered.  A 1958 WHO report remarked 
that the 1951 ISR had “come into action remarkably readily and well.”209  
                                                          
 204.  DEERE, supra note 32, at 3. 
 205.  Id. 
 206. David M. Morens, Gregory K. Folkers & Anthony S. Fauci, The Challenge of Emerging 
and Re-Emerging Infectious Diseases, 430 NATURE 242, 242 (2004) (quoting William H. Stewart, 
Surgeon General of the United States). 
 207.  WILLIAM H. MCNEILL, PLAGUES AND PEOPLES 257 (1976). 
 208.  WHO, International Sanitary Regulations—World Health Organization Regulations No. 2, 
May 25, 1951, 175 U.N.T.S. 214 [hereinafter 1951 ISR]. 
 209.  WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE FIRST TEN YEARS OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
265–74 (1958). 
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Ten years later, a subsequent WHO report warned of the “persisting and dan-
gerous potentialities of cholera, plague and yellow fever,” as well as the ap-
pearance of new diseases and the increased prevalence of existing diseases 
not covered by the 1969 IHR.210 
Some within the WHO lambasted the 1969 IHR for its failure to cover 
the most relevant diseases and its reliance on inadequate self-reporting by 
state parties.  Erik Roelsgaard, head of the WHO’s Department of Epidemi-
ology, argued in 1974 that diseases subject to the 1969 IHR were “pestilential 
diseases of the past.”211  Similarly, Ian Carter, the WHO’s Chief of Epidemi-
ological Surveillance of Communicable Diseases, advocated in 1981 for “the 
surveillance of a disease and interchange of relevant information not on the 
basis that it is included in a list but because it is of public health im-
portance.”212  In 1985, a report on the functioning of the 1969 IHR lamented 
that the law allows “only official information supplied by national health au-
thorities [to] be taken into account and disseminated,” though an outbreak 
“ha[d] been reported in the media for several days.”213  Even as the 1969 IHR 
was being negotiated in 1968, Deputy Director-General Pierre Dorolle re-
marked that the 1951 ISR were “no longer adequate” and that a “thorough 
and unbiased examination of the causes of failure of the present system and 
the possible remedies is not only timely but long overdue.”214 
In 1978, staff within the WHO prepared and distributed to member 
states a document discussing the IHR’s long-term future.  The document con-
tained a skeletal version of a proposed new set of regulations based on a shift 
away from the traditional “barrier” approach that focused on preventing in-
fections from crossing borders and toward an “epidemiological” approach 
aimed at detecting and containing outbreaks at their source.215  It also envi-
sioned a wider scope of disease coverage because “today’s developing tech-
nologies will continue to uncover diseases which are at present unknown.”216  
The proposal received uneven responses: Some countries were positive, some 
                                                          
 210.  WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE SECOND TEN YEARS OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZA-
TION: 1958–1967, at 94(1968). 
 211.  Erik Roelsgaard, Health Regulations and International Travel, 28 CHRON. WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. 265, 267 (1974). 
 212.  Letter from Ian D. Carter, Chief of Epidemiological Surveillance of Communicable Dis-
eases, World Health Org., to Jacobo Finkelman, Chief of Epidemiological Surveillance for the Reg’l 
Office of the Ams., World Health Org. (Feb. 10, 1981) (on file with author). 
 213.  World Health Org., Functioning of the International Health Regulations for the Period 1 
January to 31 December 1985 (Part I), 61 WKLY. EPIDEMIOLOGICAL REC. 385, 388 (1986). 
 214.  Pierre Dorolle, Old Plagues in the Jet Age. International Aspects of Present and Future 
Control of Communicable Disease, 4 BRIT. MED. J. 789, 792 (1968). 
 215.  World Health Org., The Long-Term Future of the International Health Regulations, 32 
CHRON. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 439, 439, 441 (1978). 
 216.  Id. at 440. 
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were firmly against it, and some took the intermediary position of approving 
the suggestions in theory but “inferr[ing] that time the was not yet ripe.”217 
After the global eradication of smallpox in 1979, an obvious opportunity 
arose to revise the 1969 IHR.  Anticipating that proposals for modifying the 
law might soon be made, an internal policy memorandum forcefully argued 
against a complete revision of the regulations.  The memorandum empha-
sized the immense costs such a revision would entail and the unlikelihood 
that significant changes would be possible: “[A] formal discussion of these 
proposals [for revision] . . . could only lead to a compromise which would 
not be satisfactory to any.”218  Consequently, smallpox was removed from 
the list of reportable diseases in 1981 without attempting to pursue further 
textual change.  Even in 1989, when the emergence of the AIDS epidemic 
made it impossible to overlook the irrelevance of the 1969 IHR, the WHO’s 
legal counsel maintained that “no one today seems to seriously contemplate 
increasing the number of ‘diseases subject to the Regulations.’”219 
Though members of the WHO’s staff strategically bypassed an infeasi-
ble revision of the 1969 IHR, they pushed for changes to the law’s imple-
mentation in informal practice.  In 1980, an internal memorandum recognized 
the inadequacy of the old law while advising “one should avoid rushing [to-
ward revision] and instead, in the meantime, prepare the ground for a change 
by educational efforts, training and drawing the attention of the health offi-
cials to the need for an epidemiological approach to the control of the spread 
of diseases internationally.”220 
B.  The Players 
A wide range of players were engaged in the dynamic and decentralized 
game of informally implementing the 1969 IHR.  Prominent among them 
were state parties to the treaty, international organizations tasked with carry-
ing out parts of the agreement, non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) 
operating in the area, private entities, and epistemic communities of experts. 
Implementation empowers actors who may not have had a substantial 
say in the treaty’s initial formulation, either because they did not have enough 
bargaining power or because they did not have a seat at the negotiating table.  
Even within the same entity or organization, implementation may vest au-
thority in a different subunit than was involved in negotiating the treaty’s 
                                                          
 217.  Memorandum from Ian D. Carter, Chief of Epidemiological Surveillance of Communica-
ble Diseases, World Health Org., to Halfdan T. Mahler, Dir.-Gen., World Health Org. (Dec. 13, 
1979) (on file with author). 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  Claude-Henri Vignes, The Future of International Health Law: WHO Perspectives, 40 
INT’L DIG. HEALTH LEGIS. 16, 18 (1989). 
 220.  Memorandum from Boris Velimirovic to Ian D. Carter, supra note 41. 
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text.  As Eskridge notes with respect to domestic statutes, many interpretive 
decisions are not made at the top of organizational hierarchies but rather at 
the front-line: the lawyer’s office; the police officer’s beat; the bureaucrat’s 
desk.221  Similarly, the implementation of treaties lends influence to lower-
level officials with technical knowledge, concrete information, and direct in-
volvement on the ground.  Due to their technical training, proximity to real-
life events, and bureaucratic incentives, these front-line implementers may 
have their own preferences for what the treaty should be. 
Countries.  States are typically treated as unitary actors in the interna-
tional sphere.222  This may be an adequate simplification when states send a 
small team of diplomats to negotiate treaty text, but the assumption quickly 
falls apart after the treaty comes into force, and implementation depends on 
action by a myriad of sub-state actors.223  The U.S. team that negotiated the 
2005 IHR consisted principally of three delegates and a support team,224 
while implementing the agreement involves the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, the Department of Health and Human Services, as well as 
many state agencies, local governments, and individual hospitals and doctors 
across the country.225  Medical experts from within national public health 
agencies frequently sit on advisory committees convened by the WHO and 
make recommendations that are at odds with what the foreign affairs depart-
ment can actually agree to in formal negotiations.226  Sub-state actors are key 
drivers of implementation dynamism.227 
                                                          
 221.  ESKRIDGE, supra note 157, at 71–72. 
 222.  See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
4 (2005) (explaining why the authors “give the state the starring role” as opposed to sub-state entities 
such as the President or governmental departments). 
 223.  See, e.g., Rachel Brewster & Adam Chilton, Supplying Compliance: Why and When the 
United States Complies with WTO Rulings, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. 201, 202 (2014) (noting that carry-
ing out a treaty “often requires action from different parts of the domestic government”). 
 224.  For the November 2004 round of negotiations, the core team consisted of the Ambassador 
to Geneva, a state department representative, and the Health Attaché of the Permanent Mission to 
Geneva, who was replaced by a representative from the Department of Health and Human Services 
part way through.  Intergovernmental Working Grp. for the Revision of the Int’l Health Regulations, 
WHO, List of Participants, at 8, WHO Doc. A/IHR/IGWG/DIV/3 Rev.1 (Nov. 4, 2004).  For the 
round of negotiations that took place in 2005, the team consisted of the Ambassador to Geneva, the 
Health Attaché of the Permanent Mission to Geneva, and a state department representative.  Inter-
governmental Working Grp. for the Revision of the Int’l Health Regulations, WHO, List of Partic-
ipants, at 8, WHO Doc. A/IHR/IGWG/2/DIV/3 Rev.2 (May 12, 2005). 
 225.  The United States adopted the 2005 IHR subject to a contentious reservation maintaining 
“the right to assume obligations under these Regulations in a manner consistent with its fundamental 
principles of federalism.”  2005 IHR (3d ed. 2016), supra note 201, app. 2, at 60. 
 226.  See infra Section III.C. 
 227.  The possibility that minor government officials might bring about treaty changes beyond 
the control of foreign affairs departments was one reason the draft Vienna Convention article al-
lowing treaties to be modified by altered subsequent practice was rejected.  Nolte, supra note 87, at 
200–01 n.229. 
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International organizations.  Many treaties delegate responsibilities to 
a centralized international organization with some autonomy.228  The 1969 
IHR, for example, relied on the WHO to receive disease notifications229 and 
to disseminate that information back to state parties.230  The 2005 IHR relies 
on the WHO even more—to conduct independent surveillance,231 to verify 
disease reports,232 to determine whether a “public health emergency of inter-
national concern” is occurring,233 and to collaborate with state parties in re-
sponding to outbreaks.234  Yet, international organizations can develop and 
pursue their own interests separate from those of its member states.235  These 
organizational interests typically stem from epistemic preferences surround-
ing a shared professional identity and common vision of what “good policy” 
entails236 or bureaucratic incentives relating to job security, prospects for ad-
vancement, and contests for funding.237  In implementing treaties, interna-
tional organizations may take actions that are undesired by member states by 
minimizing efforts (shirking) or by shifting policy preferences to their own 
(slippage).238  Just as domestic administrative agencies are particularly well-
positioned to drive change in the dynamic game of statutory interpretation,239 
international organizations are well-positioned to push for new ways of treaty 
implementation. 
NGOs and private entities.  NGOs and private entities may also have a 
hand in and seek influence over a treaty’s implementation.  They may be 
regulated parties, such as airlines and cruise lines that are affected by inter-
national trade and travel restrictions required or authorized under infectious 
                                                          
 228.  See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal International 
Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 4 (1998) (arguing that states use international organiza-
tions as vehicles for cooperation because of the efficiency gains from centralization and the legiti-
macy gains from a degree of autonomy). 
 229.  1969 IHR, supra note 19, arts. 3–8. 
 230.  Id. art. 11. 
 231.  2005 IHR, supra note 18, art. 5(4). 
 232.  Id. art. 10. 
 233.  Id. art. 12. 
 234.  Id. art. 13(3). 
 235.  See Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of 
International Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699, 699 (1999) (arguing that international organiza-
tions can exude “dysfunctional, even pathological, behavior” when they “exercise power autono-
mously in ways unintended and unanticipated” by the states that created them). 
 236.  MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 5 (2004). 
 237.  Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 235, at 716–17. 
 238.  Darren G. Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, 
and Principal-Agent Theory, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 8 
(Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006). 
 239.  See supra Section II.B. 
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disease regulations.240  They may be activist NGOs promoting their own 
agendas or operating through another organization.  Doctors Without Bor-
ders, for instance, treated over ten thousand patients during the recent Ebola 
epidemic241 and was one of the most vocal critics of the WHO and the 2005 
IHR.242  Private donors, such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and 
pharmaceutical companies, are also able to influence implementation indi-
rectly through their monetary contributions to the WHO, individual coun-
tries, and outbreak control efforts.243  Approximately eighty percent of the 
WHO’s program budget comes from voluntary donations,244 including sig-
nificant amounts over ten percent from the Bill & Melinda Gates Founda-
tion.245  These non-governmental and private actors have shaped the imple-
mentation of international infectious disease law. 
Epistemic communities.  Implementation may be shaped by loose net-
works of technical experts with an authoritative claim on policy knowledge 
within an issue area.  Peter M. Haas calls these networks “epistemic commu-
nities” and defines them by their members’ shared normative beliefs, causal 
beliefs, and common policy enterprise.246  Epistemic communities can influ-
ence implementation choices by controlling information, framing issues, and 
suggesting solutions.247  The Federation of American Scientists, for instance, 
played a critical role in developing internet outbreak surveillance tools during 
the 1990s, as discussed below.  Epistemic communities also exert influence 
when their members weave in and out of other institutions.  One example is 
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dation Global Partner Forum (May 8, 2015), http://www.msf.org/en/article/remarks-international-
president-msf-dr-joanne-liu-gates-foundation-global-partner-forum (stating that the WHO’s slow 
response and lack of capacity and expertise to respond to epidemics “caused untold suffering and 
death”). 
 243.  See infra note 245 and accompanying text. 
 244.  World Health Assembly Res. 68.1, Programme Budget 2016–2017 (May 22, 2015).  The 
WHO’s program budget for the 2016 to 2017 financial period consisted of $4385 million in total 
funding, $3456 million of which were voluntary contributions.  Id.  
 245.  WHO, Voluntary Contributions by Fund and by Contributor, 2016, at 8, WHO Doc. 
A70/INF./4 (May 16, 2017). 
 246.  Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordina-
tion, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 2–3 (1992). 
 247.  Id. at 2. 
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David Heymann, who was appointed the WHO’s Assistant Director-General 
for Communicable Diseases in 2007.248  He held various other roles within 
the WHO, led the WHO’s response to the SARS outbreak in 2003, previously 
worked for the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and is now 
a Professor of Infectious Disease Epidemiology at the London School of Hy-
giene and Tropical Medicine, where he authors works pushing for changes to 
the 2005 IHR’s implementation.249 
C.  The Strategies 
In theory, those unsatisfied with a treaty as written can withdraw, seek 
its formal interpretation or reinterpretation by an authoritative adjudicatory 
body, or lobby to revise its text according to the Vienna Convention or revi-
sion provisions within the treaty itself.  But withdrawal is a blunt tool avail-
able only to state parties; authoritative adjudication rarely occurs even when 
formal procedures for dispute resolution exist; and revision is typically infea-
sible until the political climate leading to the initial compromise shifts. 
During the decades after the 1969 IHR came into force, each of these 
constraints were in place.  Nearly all of the WHO’s member states were state 
parties to the 1969 IHR,250 yet no party withdrew despite well-recognized 
problems with the treaty.  The 1969 IHR contained a formal adjudicatory 
process by which disputes not settled by the WHO’s executive head could 
then be referred to a committee within the WHO and finally to the ICJ.251  
But disputes were almost exclusively dealt with through the WHO’s informal 
mediation efforts.  A WHO committee was convened only once—to address 
a 1970 controversy involving Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria252—and no dis-
putes have been referred to the ICJ.  As noted above, proposals from the 
WHO’s staff to dramatically revise the text of the 1969 IHR did not receive 
enough support from member states to be politically feasible.253  Conse-
quently, the 1969 IHR was revised in only marginal ways prior to 2005.  In 
1973, the provisions on cholera were adjusted; and in 1981, smallpox was 
removed from the list of reportable diseases in view of its eradication.254  
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These modest revisions belie the far-reaching changes that were in fact oc-
curring gradually via the law’s implementation in practice. 
Implementation offers those seeking change unique opportunities that 
might otherwise be unavailable.  It presents new questions or new permuta-
tions of old questions, which, in turn, open up space to redefine the boundary 
between what the law condones or authorizes and what it does not, or to layer 
additional informal practices on top of those connected to the existing 
treaty.255  Informal implementation dynamism is easier to achieve because 
the change is initially limited to a particular instance and the particular parties 
involved in that instance.  It, therefore, requires less consensus and less com-
mitment.  And, it curtails concerns about uncertainty and sovereignty since 
the circumstances are concrete and known.256  Informal implementation 
changes are frequently not announced as a “change” to the treaty at issue and 
do not require sign-off by the same high-level officials or high-profile de-
partments whose approval would be needed to alter the treaty’s text.  For the 
same reasons, informal implementation dynamism is harder to detect and 
block for those not in favor of the change. 
Informal implementation-level change also has drawbacks and limits.  It 
is smaller in scale, less official, and its impact initially limited to the instance 
at hand.  A change in implementation may be abandoned soon after it is in-
vented, or its impact may grow over time—gradually expanding until what 
happens on the ground bears little relation to the original intention of the 
treaty-makers or the words of the treaty.  Informal implementation-level 
change can also initiate a learning process by which new information is gen-
erated, uncertainty reduced, and preferences altered such that a textual 
amendment becomes more likely in the future. 
Below, I sketch three mechanisms of informal implementation-level 
change: (1) erosion of the treaty through neglect or active efforts; (2) transi-
tion to another institutional option for addressing the underlying problem; 
and (3) conversion of the treaty from within via altered practice.257  These 
three mechanisms are presented along with illustrative examples from the 
international regulation of infectious disease.  For the sake of coherence, they 
are presented in the chronological order in which the historical episodes oc-
curred.  This Section presents these mechanisms in isolation, but as the ex-
amples show, they often operate in tandem. 
                                                          
 255.  This insight draws both from the history of international infectious disease regulation and 
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Erosion of the treaty through neglect or active efforts.258  This mecha-
nism of implementation dynamism is driven by inaction in the face of change.  
Contextual conditions shift while the treaty remains constant, opening up 
gaps between the existing agreement and the real world, and weakening the 
treaty’s impact on the ground.  Such failure to upkeep a treaty may occur due 
to neglect or abdication of responsibilities, or it may be deliberately culti-
vated through intentional decisions and actions that promote a treaty’s atro-
phy. 
This mechanism is a more moderate version of Article 62 of the Vienna 
Convention, which allows a state party to terminate or withdraw from a treaty 
when circumstances constituting an “essential basis of the consent of the par-
ties” change fundamentally and unforeseeably such that “the extent of obli-
gations still to be performed under the treaty” is “radically . . . trans-
form[ed].”259  Compared to Article 62, which has never been successfully 
asserted judicially or in a diplomatic setting,260 erosion in the face of drifting 
circumstances is more common, gradual, and subtle.  Over time, erosion can 
radically transform a treaty’s significance and impact in practice, even in the 
absence of termination, withdrawal, or any other formal change. 
Within the context of international infectious disease regulation, erosion 
of the 1969 IHR accompanied the strategic decision to pursue informal im-
plementation change on the ground.  Once the WHO’s staff and likeminded 
members of the epistemic community determined that the revisions they 
sought to the 1969 IHR were politically infeasible, they chose to deliberately 
neglect the law and, in some instances, to push it toward irrelevance.  In an 
internal memorandum explaining the decision, one WHO official recalled the 
“serious attempt” that was made to revise the 1951 ISR between 1966 and 
1969, with significant investment in time and money.261  He bemoaned that 
no significant amendment could be agreed upon except for the removal of 
typhus and relapsing fever and “[c]ertainly the revision has had no effect on 
the day to day administration of the IHR.”262 
Not only was the decision to neglect the 1969 IHR considered, but it 
was actively cultivated in an effort to minimize the law’s import while it re-
mained on the books.  In a number of incidents and publications, the 1969 
IHR was increasingly framed not as an independent mandate, but as one as-
pect of a larger strategy for infectious disease control.  In 1970, the WHO’s 
                                                          
 258.  This mechanism of erosion is similar to what scholars of institutional change call “drift.”  
See MAHONEY & THELEN, supra note 173, at 17 (“Drift occurs when rules remain formally the 
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 262.  Id. 
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staff publicized information regarding a cholera outbreak in Guinea that had 
not been reported under the 1969 IHR.263  In so doing, WHO officials 
acknowledged that they were operating outside the 1969 law but justified the 
act by reference to a broader mandate: “[I]n order to fulfil the Organization’s 
obligations under Article 2 of the WHO Constitution, the presence of cholera 
should be disclosed in the absence of notification when reliable technical ev-
idence is available.”264  The implication was that the Secretariat’s wider and 
more ambiguous mandate under the WHO’s Constitution took priority over 
its narrower mandate under the 1969 IHR—an argument that had little legal 
or historical basis. 
The 1969 IHR was further relegated to a lower status in a 1985 WHO 
publication on the functioning of the IHR.  That publication argued that re-
porting under the 1969 IHR “represents one of the ways in which epidemio-
logical information circulates among countries” but “would not be sufficient 
in isolation, because unusual events need to be detected and brought to the 
notice of other countries as and when they happen.”265  The focus on “unusual 
events” rather than the three diseases requiring notification at the time is sig-
nificant: The same report on the functioning of the IHR documented not only 
the status of those three diseases but also included a section on “[o]ther dis-
eases,” including influenza, malaria, and poliomyelitis.266  Notifications un-
der the 1969 IHR gradually occupied a smaller and smaller part of the Weekly 
Epidemiological Record267 and constituted only one small paragraph at the 
end of a lengthy report by the early 1980s. 
Transition to another institutional arrangement.268  This mechanism of 
change involves multiple institutional options for managing an underlying 
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problem.  One of these institutional options is the treaty at issue.  The others 
may take a number of forms: another international treaty, a domestic law, or 
perhaps a policy implemented by the same or different actors or agencies, 
whether international or local.  The other institutional option may already 
exist and is repurposed, or it may be created—through the active sponsorship 
of new rules or policies on top of or alongside existing ones—for the purpose 
of moving away from the disfavored treaty.  In either case, the problem is 
reframed or resituated such that it comes under the purview of a different 
institutional structure.  The mechanism may not initially look like a change 
to the treaty at all since the development begins outside of the treaty.  But as 
the transition progresses, there is a gradual shifting of relative prominence 
away from the treaty and toward the other institutional option, potentially 
leading to the crowding out of the disfavored treaty. 
Transitions to both existing alternative institutional arrangements and 
newly created ones played important roles in the history of international in-
fectious disease regulation.  A well-recognized weakness of the 1969 IHR 
was its reliance on self-reporting of covered diseases by state parties.  The 
WHO neither had the capacity to conduct its own surveillance nor the author-
ity to publish unreported information even when such information “ha[d] 
been reported in the media for several days.”269  In a 1979 policy memoran-
dum, one WHO official wrote: “The one thing that [the Department of Epi-
demiological Surveillance of Diseases] does not do in the true sense of the 
word is the surveillance of communicable disease.”270  When the WHO’s 
staff decided not to pursue an amendment to the 1969 IHR and instead to 
minimize its importance, they also began undertaking concurrent efforts to 
move infectious disease reporting beyond the confines of the 1969 law. 
Movement to an existing alternative institutional arrangement is illus-
trated by the above example concerning the 1970 cholera outbreak in 
Guinea.271  There, neglect and violation of the 1969 IHR was facilitated by 
an appeal to another mandate—the WHO’s Constitution.  Movement to a 
newly created alternative is illustrated by the WHO’s development of novel 
outbreak surveillance tools and policies during the 1990s.  Here, the WHO 
collaborated with domestic actors and agencies to devise additional channels 
of reporting that initially seemed unrelated to the 1969 IHR.  These channels 
became more salient over time and received post hoc approval, first through 
two WHO resolutions and then by the adoption of the 2005 IHR. 
With the popularization of the internet in the 1990s, the WHO collabo-
rated with a community of national medical experts to develop two global 
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surveillance tools that provided an alternative to official reporting under the 
1969 IHR.  The first was the Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases 
(“ProMED”).  Created in 1993 by attendees at a conference co-sponsored by 
the WHO and the Federation of American Scientists, ProMED is an e-mail-
based system for providing early warnings of emerging epidemics involving 
humans, animals, and plants.272  It began with forty subscribers and opened 
to the public at no cost in November 1994.273  By April 2004, ProMED 
reached nearly 35,000 direct subscribers in over 180 countries in addition to 
secondary disseminators.274  Its subscribers include WHO personnel, UN hu-
manitarian agencies, national public health agencies, and interested members 
of the public.275 
The second surveillance tool was the Global Public Health Information 
Network (“GPHIN”), a cooperative venture between Health Canada and the 
WHO, developed in the mid-1990s.276  GPHIN gathers information by mon-
itoring global media sources twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.  
Using news aggregators such as Factiva,277 GPHIN filters items first through 
an automated scanning system that identifies keywords, and then by human 
analysts working in multiple languages.  Subscription to GPHIN is restricted 
to organizations with an established public health mandate, such as the WHO, 
the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the European 
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, and military agencies.278 
Over the course of the next few years, ProMED and GPHIN were in-
creasingly relied on for early warnings of outbreaks and became routinely 
used both within and without the WHO.  ProMED posted early warnings of 
the 1995 Ebola outbreak in Zaire, the 1996 cholera outbreak in the Philip-
pines, and the Ebola outbreak in Gabon that same year—with the latter two 
outbreaks being publicized on ProMED before the WHO was authorized to 
report them.  The WHO used this information to initiate conversations with 
national governments, verify the rumored outbreaks, and offer assistance in 
containing the outbreaks.  Between July 1998 and August 2001, the WHO 
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verified 578 outbreaks in 132 countries, fifty-six percent of which were ini-
tially picked up by GPHIN.279  Outbreaks reported through these surveillance 
tools included those within the scope of the 1969 IHR as well as those beyond 
it.280  By 2003, “nonstate sources delivered far more actionable surveillance” 
than official national reporting.281 
The use of unofficial sources of outbreak information received retro-
spective approval.  In 1998, the WHO’s staff sought and received partial au-
thorization for the practice in a resolution unrelated to the 1969 IHR.  WHO 
officials drafted and submitted to member states a report describing the rapid 
emergence and spread of drug-resistant pathogens and outlining necessary 
solutions, including better surveillance to define the extent of resistance in 
different pathogens and populations.282  Based on this report, member states 
adopted a resolution authorizing the WHO to “devise means for the gathering 
and sharing of information by countries and regions concerning resistance in 
certain pathogens.”283 
That authorization was expanded in 2001 through another report and 
resolution on epidemic alert and response.  This report noted that only 
twenty-three percent of outbreak notifications received by the WHO came 
from national self-reporting, “while the most significant source was the 
Global Public Health Information Network of Canada.”284  The resolution 
urged member states to “participate actively” in the verification of surveil-
lance information.285 
By the time negotiations for the 2005 IHR began in 2004, the WHO had 
been conducting independent surveillance and relying on unofficial sources 
of outbreak information for years.  It was no longer controversial and did not 
receive much attention during the two rounds of negotiations.286  The 2005 
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IHR explicitly requires the WHO to “collect information” concerning out-
breaks “through its surveillance activities”287 and to “take into account re-
ports from sources other than notifications” from state parties.288 
Transition to another institutional option is particularly significant in the 
international context given the fragmented and nonhierarchical nature of the 
international sphere.  Political science scholars have observed that many 
countries belong to a plethora of nested and overlapping international insti-
tutions, including those that are universal, regional, and issue specific.289  The 
rising density of international regulatory regimes has led to overlap across 
agreements, conflicts between them, and confusion regarding which obliga-
tions cover a given issue.290  Legal scholars describe the international legal 
system as diffuse, decentralized, and “shaped by dynamics of cooperation 
and competition over time.”291  This environment of complexity and frag-
mentation gives rise to an abundance of opportunities to shift management of 
an underlying problem to other institutional options or actors, altering the 
implementation of a treaty on the ground without any explicit changes to the 
treaty itself. 
Conversion of the treaty from within through altered practice.292  Con-
version is perhaps the most familiar mechanism of informal implementation 
dynamism to lawyers.  It occurs when a treaty is directed toward new pur-
poses by operating within the ambiguities of the text and pushing against the 
limits of what the text means.  In the judicial context, conversion occurs 
through reinterpretation by authoritative adjudicative bodies.  In the informal 
implementation context, conversion occurs when implementers work within 
and push against the limits of treaty text to put the agreement into practice in 
a new way.  Since the 2005 IHR came into effect in 2007, there has been one 
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minor amendment in 2014: The period of effectiveness for the yellow fever 
vaccination was extended from ten years to the life of the person vac-
cinated.293  By contrast, informal implementation conversion has introduced 
far more significant changes. 
A critical subject of contention during the 2005 IHR negotiations was 
the proposed requirement that state parties develop a minimum level of core 
public health capacity so that they are able to detect, report, and respond 
promptly to “public health emergenc[ies] of international concern.”294  Nu-
merous member states protested that the requirement was “very onerous,” 
expressed concern about sovereignty implications, demanded a commitment 
to transfer resources to the poorest countries, and argued that the law should 
allow adequate time for changes to take place.295 
Negotiating states were not able to come to a consensus on many of 
these issues.  Ultimately, the 2005 IHR postponed the law’s entry into force 
to two years after adoption (2007) and set the deadline for attaining core ca-
pacity requirements at five years (2012) with the possibility of two two-year 
extensions (to 2014 and 2016).296  The WHO must, “to the extent possible,” 
help states evaluate existing capacities and mobilize financial resources to 
support developing countries’ efforts to build and maintain the required ca-
pacities.297  State parties must “undertake to collaborate with each other, to 
the extent possible,” in developing capacities and in mobilizing financial re-
sources for general implementation.298  No quantitative financial commit-
ments were made.  At the time of its adoption, scholars identified the law’s 
lack of stronger provisions for transferring financial and technical resources 
as a “a serious problem.”299 
During the years after the 2005 IHR went into effect, capacity building 
was an area of persistent difficulty.  After the H1N1 influenza pandemic in 
2009, a review committee of national public health experts convened by the 
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tions (2005), ¶ 2, WHO Doc. A67/VR/9 (May 24, 2014). 
 294.  2005 IHR, supra note 18, arts. 6(1). 
 295.  See WHO Proposals for the Revision of the International Health Regulations: Comments 
Received, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/ihr/revisionprocess/comments/en/ (last vis-
ited May 13, 2019) (listing comments received from various countries and “other interested part-
ners” prior to and between the two rounds of intergovernmental negotiations). 
 296.  2005 IHR, supra note 18, arts. 5(1)–(2), 13(1)–(2), annex 1; 2005 IHR (3d ed. 2016), supra 
note 201, at 1.  
 297. 2005 IHR, supra note 18, art. 44(2). 
 298.  Id. art. 44(1). 
 299.  Fidler & Gostin, supra note 200, at 88. 
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WHO recommended first and foremost that the implementation of core ca-
pacities be accelerated.300  The Ebola outbreak in 2013 to 2016, which re-
sulted in more than 11,000 deaths,301 was attributed to “large-scale noncom-
pliance” with the 2005 IHR’s capacity-building requirements in the three 
countries most affected by the epidemic—Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Le-
one.302  By November 2014, only thirty-three percent of state parties self-
reported that they had met the capacity requirements, while forty-two percent 
requested a second extension to 2016, and twenty-five percent did not com-
municate their intentions to the WHO at all.303 
Members of the infectious disease epistemic community identified sev-
eral weaknesses in the capacity-building aspect of the 2005 IHR and argued 
that the law “need[ed] more teeth.”304  Chief among these weaknesses were 
reliance on self-assessment and self-reporting by member states and the ab-
sence of standing financial commitments305—issues that could not be re-
solved during the 2005 IHR’s negotiation and remained contentious in sub-
sequent years.306  Legal and public health experts suggested independent 
evaluations of domestic public health capacities and clearer benchmarks,307 
                                                          
 300.  Director-General, WHO, Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005), 
¶ 8, WHO Doc. A65/17 (Mar. 22, 2012). 
 301.  Director-General, WHO, Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005): 
Rep. of the Review Committee on the Role of the International Health Regulations (2005) in the 
Ebola Outbreak and Response, ¶ 1, WHO Doc. A69/21 (May 13, 2016). 
 302.  David P. Fidler, Epic Failure of Ebola and Global Health Security, 21 BROWN J. WORLD 
AFF. 179, 187 (2015). 
 303.  Director-General, WHO, Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005): 
Rep. of the Review Committee on Second Extensions for Establishing National Public Health Ca-
pacities and on IHR Implementation, at 2, WHO Doc. EB136/22 Add.1 (Jan. 16, 2015). 
 304.  Dr. Margaret Chan, Dir.-Gen., World Health Org., Report by the Director-General to the 
Special Session of the Executive Board on Ebola (Jan. 25, 2015), 
http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2015/executive-board-ebola/en/. 
 305.  See, e.g., Rebecca Katz & Julie Fischer, The Revised International Health Regulations: A 
Framework for Global Pandemic Response, 3 GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE 1, 9 (2010) (noting 
that lack of financial commitments was the 2005 IHR’s “greatest operational challenge”). 
 306.  Suerie Moon et al., Will Ebola Change the Game? Ten Essential Reforms Before the Next 
Pandemic.  The Report of the Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola, 
386 LANCET 2204, 2209 (2015). 
 307.  Director-General, supra note 303, ¶ 43 (recommending that the WHO “consider a variety 
of approaches for the shorter- and longer-term assessment and development of IHR core capacities,” 
including regional formal evaluations or meta-evaluations); COMM’N ON A GLOB. HEALTH RISK 
FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE, THE NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF GLOBAL SECURITY: A FRAME-
WORK TO COUNTER INFECTIOUS DISEASE CRISES 33 (2016) (suggesting that a “regular, independ-
ent, transparent, and objective assessment mechanism” be devised to evaluate national capacity 
building); Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The International Health Regulations 10 Years on: The Gov-
erning Framework for Global Health Security, 386 LANCET 2222, 2224 (2015) (recommending that 
the “WHO should establish an independent peer-review core capacity evaluation system”); Moon 
et al., supra note 306, at 2204 (“[A]ll governments must agree to regular, independent, external 
assessment of their core capacities.”). 
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which could be tied to the provision of external financing.308  A 2016 WHO 
report on the 2005 IHR concluded that, after Ebola, “exclusive use of this 
[self-assessment] approach is no longer appropriate” and that “over-reliance 
on self-assessment has led to incomplete and unreliable reporting of core ca-
pacities.”309 
While there was discussion about revising the 2005 IHR to stipulate 
more concrete requirements for building public health capacities,310 there was 
also fear that “reopening the full text could entail a multiyear negotiating 
process.”311  A number of experts recommended against “renegotiating the 
main text of the International Health Regulations,” and instead suggested 
pursuing the proposed legal reforms through “informal means” such as tex-
tual reinterpretation.312  Again, informal implementation-level change served 
as a more feasible alternative to formal change. 
Over the last few years, the WHO and other members of the epistemic 
community have worked to convert the meaning of the 2005 IHR’s core ca-
pacity requirements while also transitioning some of its implementation to 
other institutional arrangements.  In 2016, the WHO developed a “Joint Ex-
ternal Evaluation Tool” for monitoring, assessing, and reporting core capac-
ities.313  That tool has been operationalized by a newly-formed Joint External 
Evaluation Alliance (“the Alliance”) comprised of seventy-two members, in-
cluding thirty-one countries and a range of international organizations, de-
velopment banks, NGOs, and private foundations.314  The Alliance draws its 
legal mandate from not only the 2005 IHR, but also the UN’s sustainable 
development goal on good health and well-being, standards generated by the 
World Organisation for Animal Health, and the Sendai Framework for Dis-
aster Risk Reduction.315  As of May 24, 2019, ninety-six external evaluations 
have been conducted in six regions, with twenty-one more scheduled.316 
                                                          
 308.  Moon et al., supra note 306, at 2209 (“Monitoring requirements should accompany exter-
nal financing.”).  
 309.  Director-General, supra note 301, ¶¶ 28, 29. 
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 311.  Gostin et al., supra note 307, at 2223. 
 312.  Id.; see also COMM’N ON A GLOB. HEALTH RISK FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE, supra 
note 307, at 33 (“It should not be necessary to open the 2005 IHR to renegotiation to determine new 
definitions and benchmarks [for national capacity-building requirements], since these could be de-
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 313.  See generally WORLD HEALTH ORG., JOINT EXTERNAL EVALUATION TOOL: INTERNA-
TIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (2005) (2016), http://apps.who.int/iris/bit-
stream/10665/204368/1/9789241510172_eng.pdf?ua=1.  
 314.  Members, JEE ALL., https://www.jeealliance.org/members/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2019). 
 315.  About, JEE ALL., https://www.jeealliance.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
 316.  Joint External Evaluation (JEE), JEE ALL., https://www.jeealliance.org/global-health-se-
curity-and-ihr-implementation/joint-external-evaluation-jee/ (last visited May 30, 2019). 
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IV.  INVESTIGATING WRITTEN INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIME 
Peeling back the textual and formal façade of the 1969 and 2005 IHRs 
reveals a richly dynamic world of informal implementation that unfolded in 
unpredictable ways as the treaties were put into practice over long spans of 
time.  This history cannot be captured by the Vienna Convention’s doctrinal 
concept of subsequent practice, and suggests that treaty dynamism is far more 
varied and complex than depicted by existing scholarship.  Focusing on for-
mal change mechanisms generates a picture that is not only incomplete but 
also potentially misleading.  It can underestimate the level of dynamism when 
a treaty is apparently static, overestimate the level of dynamism when a treaty 
is explicitly amended, and provide an inaccurate portrayal of how the under-
lying problem was in fact managed on the ground.  In the infectious disease 
context, informal implementation-level change was neither secondary in im-
portance, nor sequential in temporal order, to formal changes to the treaty’s 
text, membership, or judicial interpretation.  
Exposing the informal implementation dynamism of treaties opens up 
new questions while challenging assumptions at the heart of our current un-
derstanding of written international law. 
Empirical questions.  More empirical studies are needed to determine 
how generalizable insights drawn from the international regulation of infec-
tious disease are to other areas of international law.  The prevalence and sig-
nificance of informal change has been noted by other scholars in areas such 
as intellectual property and trade, suggesting that similar dynamics are at 
work elsewhere.317  Yet, the 1969 and 2005 IHRs are unique in certain re-
spects.  Unlike the usual opt-in and ratification processes, these agreements 
were adopted by a majority vote of the WHO’s policy-making organ, com-
posed of representatives from all member states,318 and came into force after 
a period of time for all member states except those that opted out or submitted 
reservations.319  Compared to other multilateral treaties, these agreements are 
very widely subscribed to, with the 2005 IHR now being legally binding on 
                                                          
 317.  See DEERE, supra note 32; Levit, supra note 32. 
 318.  The WHO’s policy-making organ is the World Health Assembly.  See World Health As-
sembly, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/about/governance/world-health-assembly 
(last visited June 3, 2019). 
 319.  This streamlined treaty adoption process is set out in Article 21 of the Constitution of the 
World Health Organization and authorizes the World Health Assembly to adopt regulations on five 
specific subject areas, including the prevention of international disease spread.  See WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., Constitution of the World Health Organization, in BASIC DOCUMENTS 1, 7–8 (48th 
ed. 2014).  
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196 state parties.320  And these treaties are administered by the WHO’s cen-
tralized bureaucracy of experts321 and concern a technical, “low politics” 
topic.  The overall implication of these features for the likelihood of informal 
versus formal change is unclear.  One might expect formal change to be easier 
and therefore informal change less prominent given the streamlined adoption 
and revision process; one might expect the opposite given the large number 
of state parties involved and the presence of a centralized bureaucracy.  Both 
formal and informal change might be more difficult in a “high politics” area. 
Studies across subject matters and treaty types are needed not only to 
test the extensibility of this Article’s findings, but also to explore further em-
pirical puzzles, including when informal implementation change is preferable 
to alternatives such as unilateral withdrawal and creating a rival agree-
ment,322 how the three mechanisms of informal implementation dynamism 
interact with each other, and when implementers choose one strategy over 
another. These empirical questions call for methodologies that are appropri-
ate for investigating international law in time.  Studies that are deep (delving 
beneath the text and authoritative interpretation of a treaty to examine the 
often-hidden actors and processes that translate it into practice), wide (exam-
ining not only the treaty at issue but other laws, policies, and institutions that 
might provide oblique channels for change), and long (looking past snapshots 
of the treaty to observe its continuous evolution across extended periods of 
time) are needed to see the full panoply of change in action. 
Conceptual questions.  The vast scope of change achievable through in-
formal implementation dynamism and its ability to precipitate future textual 
amendment suggest that we need to rethink our very idea of what written 
international law is.  For decades, the study of international law has been 
permeated with existential anxieties about enforcement problems and non-
compliance,323 where measuring compliance “merely requires comparing the 
relevant activity with the treaty’s requirements.”324  Underlying this empha-
                                                          
 320.  States Parties to the International Health Regulations (2005), supra note 190. 
 321.  Much like an executive agency, the WHO’s day-to-day activities are run by its Secretar-
iat—a permanent staff composed of thousands of experts that exercise some degree of autonomy.  
See WHO—Organizational Structure, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/about/who-we-
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(1985). 
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1964 (2002). 
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sis on compliance and the straightforward portrayal of the relationship be-
tween “the relevant activity” and “the treaty’s requirements” is an unspoken 
conceptual model that casts international agreements as blueprints awaiting 
faithful execution.  The dynamism of “the relevant activity” and its capacity 
to sometimes leap ahead of and foreshadow “the treaty’s requirements” cuts 
at the very core of this model.  In fact, treaties may more accurately be de-
scribed as departure points for further bargaining among implementers as 
constraints and opportunities reveal themselves over time.325 
Recognizing the full range of treaty dynamism brings to a head a num-
ber of criticisms on the study of compliance.  Measuring the level of compli-
ance provides little insight on its significance and consequences over time.  
A high rate of compliance does not necessarily signal that a treaty is effec-
tively addressing the underlying problem,326 nor does it mean that a treaty 
has caused change in state behavior.327  Conversely, a low rate of compliance 
is not necessarily deleterious, since not all noncompliance is equal.  Some 
noncompliance may be inevitable or may even serve a purpose.328  As ob-
served from the international infectious disease case study, problems with 
enforcement are often opportunities that open up space for future change.  
More nuanced investigations are needed to untangle the relationship between 
compliance and informal implementation change. 
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Normative questions.  More thinking is also needed on the question of 
whether informal implementation dynamism is normatively desirable.  On 
the one hand, informal change could undermine the formal negotiation and 
consent-based processes laid out in the Vienna Convention that currently un-
derpins the legitimacy of written international law.  Informal change can take 
international lawmaking out of public view and beyond the control of any 
one state party.  It can detract from international law’s predictability if a 
treaty might mean something different tomorrow than it does today.  And it 
can weaken the commitment signaled by joining an international agreement 
in the first place if informal implementation change becomes widely ex-
pected.329 
On the other hand, many scholars of global governance and public pol-
icy have criticized formal negotiation processes for giving an outsized voice 
to wealthy countries and special interests within those countries while treat-
ing developing countries and the people within them unfairly.330  By contrast, 
informal implementation dynamism could create openings for contestation 
by a broader set of actors, including developing countries, sub-state actors, 
NGOs, technical experts, and the permanent staff of international organiza-
tions, which could in turn give greater voice to those disempowered by the 
formal process.  Further examples as well as a theoretical account are needed 
to elucidate this hypothesis.  Such an account could be drawn from relational 
contracts,331 dynamic statutory interpretation,332 or the historical literature on 
imperialism.333  If this hypothesis holds water, then just as contract scholars 
have suggested a “movement away from the notion of consent as the binding 
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force and principal source of legal obligation,” international law scholars, 
too, might need to look beyond consent for legitimacy.334 
V.  CONCLUSION 
I intend this Article to enrich our understanding of how treaties change 
over time.  The Article cautions against an analysis of treaties that begins and 
ends with the treaty text, formal implementing mechanisms, and the written 
decisions of authoritative adjudicatory bodies.  It invites scholars to under-
take longitudinal studies and to look deep into the bureaucracies and epis-
temic communities that shape how a treaty plays out in the world. 
The history of international infectious disease regulation reveals a set of 
ordinarily hidden actors and strategies whose interactions have made and re-
made treaties every day, even as those treaties appeared formally stable.  Like 
the ship of Theseus, whose decaying planks were replaced one by one until 
none of the original pieces remained, infectious disease regulation shifted in-
crementally, from the ground up, making it difficult to pinpoint one specific 
moment when change occurred.  Uncovering the complex relationship be-
tween stability and change casts fresh light on foundational questions in in-
ternational law and ushers in new inquiries for future exploration. 
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